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I. INTRODUCTION
In the Information Age, an increasing amount of personal information
is contained in records maintained by Internet Service Providers (ISPs),
phone companies, cable companies, merchants, bookstores, websites,
hotels, landlords, employers and private sector entities. Many private
sector entities are beginning to aggregate the information in these records
to create extensive digital dossiers.1
The data in these digital dossiers increasingly flows from the private
sector to the government, particularly for law enforcement use. Law
enforcement agencies have long sought personal information about
individuals from various third parties to investigate fraud, white-collar
crime, drug trafficking, computer crime, child pornography, and other types
of criminal activity. In the aftermath of the terrorist attacks of September
11, 2001, the impetus for the government to gather personal information
has greatly increased, since such data can be useful to track down terrorists
and to profile airline passengers for more thorough searches.2 Detailed
records of an individual’s reading materials, purchases, diseases, and
website activity enable the government to assemble a profile of an
individual’s finances, health, psychology, beliefs, politics, interests, and
lifestyle.3 This data can unveil a person’s anonymous speech and personal
associations.4
The increasing amount of personal information flowing to the
government poses significant problems with far-reaching social effects.
Inadequately constrained government information-gathering can lead to at
least three types of harms. First, it can result in the slow creep toward a
totalitarian state.5 Second, it can chill democratic activities and interfere
1. See infra Part II.
2. See infra Part II.
3. See infra Part II.
4. Government access to such data may implicate one’s First Amendment rights to freedom of
speech and freedom of association. See infra Part II.C.
5. See, e.g., DAVID H. FLAHERTY, PROTECTING PRIVACY IN SURVEILLANCE SOCIETIES (1989);
PAUL M. SCHWARTZ & JOEL R. REIDENBERG, DATA PRIVACY LAW 39 (1996); ( “[T]otalitarian regimes
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with individual self-determination.6 Third, it can lead to the danger of
harms arising in bureaucratic settings.7 Individuals, especially in times of
crisis, are vulnerable to abuse from government misuse of personal
information.
Once government entities have collected personal
information, there are few regulations of how it can be used and how long
it can be kept. The bureaucratic nature of modern law enforcement
institutions can enable sweeping searches, the misuse of personal data,
improper exercises of discretion, unjustified interrogation and arrests,
roundups of disfavored individuals, and discriminatory profiling.8 These
types of harms often do not result from malicious intent or the desire for
domination. Justice Brandeis was prescient when he observed that people
“are naturally alert to repel invasion of their liberty by evil-minded rulers.
The greatest dangers to liberty lurk in the insidious encroachment by men
of zeal, well-meaning but without understanding.”9
The transfer of personal information from the private sector to the
government thus requires some form of regulatory control, a way to
balance privacy with effective law enforcement. The first source for
protecting privacy against infringement by law enforcement agencies is the
Fourth Amendment, which prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures
and requires that the government first obtain judicial authorization before
conducting a search or seizure. According the Supreme Court, “[t]he
overriding function of the Fourth Amendment is to protect personal privacy
and dignity against unwarranted intrusion by the State.”10 The Court,
however, has held that there is no reasonable expectation of privacy in
records maintained by third parties.11 In the void left by the absence of
Fourth Amendment protection, a series of statutes provide some limited
in Eastern Europe relied on information gathering and data storage to weaken the individual capacity
for critical reflection and to repress any social movements outside their control.”); Paul M. Schwartz,
Privacy and Participation: Personal Information and Public Sector Regulation in the United States, 80
IOWA L. REV. 553, 560 (1995); Peter P. Swire, Financial Privacy and the Theory of High-Tech
Government Surveillance, 77 WASH. U. L.Q. 461, 471 (1999) (articulating problems of “how an
authoritarian or totalitarian government might use and abuse information about citizens’ financial
transactions”).
6. See generally Paul M. Schwartz, Internet Privacy and the State, 32 CONN. L. REV. 815
(2000); Paul M. Schwartz, Privacy and Democracy in Cyberspace, 52 VAND. L. REV. 1609 (1999).
7. I previously explored the contrast between these two types of power in the context of private
sector information collection and use. See Daniel J. Solove, Privacy and Power: Computer Databases
and Metaphors for Information Privacy, 53 STAN. L. REV. 1393 (2001).
8. See infra Part III.
9. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 479 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
10. Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 767 (1966).
11. See, e.g., Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 743 (1979); United States v. Miller, 425 U.S.
435, 444 (1976). For a more extensive discussion of these cases and others, see infra Part III.C.
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restraints on government access to third party records.12 The protections of
the statutory regime are far less exacting than those of the Fourth
Amendment; information can be obtained through mere subpoenas and
court orders, which have relatively few constraints and little meaningful
judicial oversight. Further, numerous classes of records are not covered at
all. Thus, there is a profoundly inadequate legal response to the emerging
problem of government access to aggregations of data, “digital dossiers”
that are increasingly becoming digital biographies.
A similar scenario unfolded in 1928, when the Supreme Court held in
Olmstead v. United States13 that wiretapping a person’s home telephone did
not run afoul of the Fourth Amendment. The Court rigidly adhered to a
conception of privacy that recognized only physical invasions, which did
not include wiretapping because there was no physical trespass to the
home. Following Olmstead, Congress enacted § 605 of the Federal
Communications Act of 1934 to regulate wiretapping, but the law was
grossly ineffective.14 Olmstead left a void in regulating the central threats
to privacy in the twentieth century—wiretapping and electronic
surveillance—which dramatically increased without adequate regulatory
controls and oversight.15 In 1967, the Court overruled Olmstead.16 Today,
it remains a relic of the past, a long discredited decision. It symbolizes the
Court’s lack of responsiveness to new technology, unwarranted formalism
in its constitutional interpretation, and failure to see the larger purposes of
the Fourth Amendment.
Despite the fact that Olmstead was overruled, its spirit has been
reincarnated. The new Olmstead era, and its full implications are just
beginning to emerge. The Court’s current conception of privacy is as a
form of total secrecy.17 As conceived by the Court, an individual’s hidden
world should be protected. It has expressed an interest in safeguarding the
intimate information that individuals carefully conceal. Privacy is about
protecting the skeletons that are meticulously hidden in the closet. Since
information maintained by third parties is exposed to others, it is not

12. See infra Part IV.
13. 277 U.S. 438, 464 (1928).
14. For a discussion of the ineffectiveness of § 605, see infra Part IV.A.1.
15. See infra Part III.B.
16. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 356, 356 (1967).
17. Elsewhere, I contend that privacy must be conceptualized in a multifaceted way, from the
bottom-up by focusing on social practices rather than a rigid category with a single unifying essence or
common denominator. See Daniel J. Solove, Conceptualizing Privacy, 90 CAL. L. REV. 1087, 1088–99
(2002).
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private, and therefore not protected by the Fourth Amendment.18 This
conception of privacy is not responsive to life in the modern Information
Age, where most personal information exists in the record systems of
hundreds of entities. The Court has turned its back on one of the most farreaching and potentially dangerous law enforcement practices of our times.
Similar to the 40 years following Olmstead, the only form of regulatory
control is statutory, which has thus far has been woefully inadequate.
In this Article, I contend that this state of affairs poses one of the most
significant threats to privacy in the twenty-first century. The protection of
privacy requires an “architecture of power.”19 This architecture represents
the way that law structures social relationships. The law creates and
constructs the world we live in by shaping an individual’s relationships
with other individuals, institutions, and the government. Ideally, the law
should establish an architecture of power to maintain an appropriate
balance of power in these relationships. Such a balance is critical to
dignity, self-fulfillment, freedom, democracy, and other fundamental
values. In our highly bureaucratized world, personal information is an
essential element of these relationships. Protecting privacy with an
architecture of power involves erecting a legal structure for responding to
the ever-increasing data flows of the Information Age. Beyond a set of
individual rights, protecting privacy requires an architecture that regulates
the way information may be collected and used.
The focus of this Article is on our relationships with the government.
An architecture of power must address two fundamental problems of
government. First, it should address how to control the population without
stifling liberty, in other words, how to balance order and freedom. Second,
it should determine how to control the government so that it remains
accountable to the people. This includes preventing officials from abusing
their power, and guarding against excessive growth in government power
that threatens to override the power of the people. One of the most

18. See infra Part III.C.
19. Lawrence Lessig has popularized the term “architecture” to refer to technological systems of
governance—the way that computer code structures what we can do and how we act in cyberspace. See
generally, LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE AND OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE (1999) [hereinafter CODE];
Lawrence Lessig, The Architecture of Privacy, 1 VAND. J. ENT. L. & PRAC. 56 (1999). I use this term
more broadly than Lessig does, to refer to a particular power structure, not merely created by computer
code or technology, but by the law. Although certainly not antagonistic to law, Lessig’s view of
privacy privileges technological to legal architecture. According to Lessig, law merely sets the default
entitlements to information, and technological architectures do the rest. See id. at 160–61. However, I
believe that law has a much larger role to play in the protection of privacy. Solove, supra note 7, at
1445–55.
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profound powers of the government is its machinery for enforcing the law,
which increasingly requires personal information to function. Therefore,
an architecture of power must be developed to regulate the flow of personal
information between the private sector and the government. In this Article,
I compare the architectures established by the Fourth Amendment to the
current statutory regulatory regime, and articulate a theory identifying the
types of architectural features that will create the appropriate balance
between privacy and effective law enforcement.
In Part II, I describe the extensive records of personal information that
are maintained by third parties and the rapidly increasing information flows
between the government and private sector entities. I illustrate why these
information flows present a serious threat to privacy and why an
architecture of power is essential to ensure that privacy is adequately
protected.
In Part III, I describe the basic architecture of power that the Fourth
Amendment endeavors to establish and explain why this architecture has
many important features for the effective protection of privacy.
Specifically, I contend that the Fourth Amendment embodies a Madisonian
theory of government that aims to balance government control with liberty
while at the same time keeping government power under control.
Substantively, it restricts searches and seizures through the reasonableness
requirement and provides procedural safeguards through the warrant and
probable cause requirements. These reflect the fractionalization of power
among different government branches that James Madison believed was
essential to restrain governmental power. I quarrel with a number of
prominent critics who contend that the Fourth Amendment should not
concern itself with protecting privacy. In the world of modern law
enforcement, which has become significantly bureaucratized, privacy is an
essential facet of the relationship between the government and the people.
I explain at length why this is so, and defend the wisdom of the Fourth
Amendment’s architecture of power against its critics.
In Part IV, I critique the architecture of power created by the statutory
regime that has filled the void left by the inapplicability of the Fourth
Amendment to third party records. This architecture of power is a faulty
one—uneven, overly complex, filled with gaps and loopholes, and
containing numerous weak spots.
In Part V, I suggest guidelines for an appropriate architecture of power
to regulate government access to personal information in third party record
systems. Regarding the scope of the architecture, I develop a way to define
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what types of government information gathering from third parties should
be regulated. This is a particularly difficult question. Too broad of a scope
could hinder legitimate law enforcement because criminal investigations
often require the gathering of data from third parties. Since the type of
information collection that raises concern involves data gathered from
dossiers maintained in private sector entities, I recommend that the
architecture should encompass all instances where third parties share
personal data contained within a “system of records,” a term I borrow from
the federal Privacy Act. Regarding the architecture’s structure, I explore a
spectrum of procedural mechanisms to establish the delicate balance
between privacy and law enforcement interests. I recommend a fusion of
Fourth Amendment architecture and the architecture of subpoenas and
court orders.
II. GOVERNMENT INFORMATION GATHERING AND THE
PRIVATE SECTOR
A. THIRD PARTY RECORDS AND THE GOVERNMENT
We live in the early stages of the Information Age, a time when
technology has given us unprecedented abilities to communicate, transfer
and share information, access data, and analyze a profound array of facts
and ideas. The complete benefits of the Information Age do not simply
come to us. We must “plug in” to join in. In other words, we must
establish relationships with a panoply of companies. To connect to the
Internet, we must subscribe to an ISP, such as America Online (AOL) or
Earthlink. To be able to receive more than a few television channels, we
need to open an account with a cable company. Phone service, mobile
phone service, and other utilities require us to open accounts with a number
of entities.
Further, life in modern society demands that we enter into numerous
relationships with professionals (doctors, lawyers, accountants), businesses
(restaurants, video rental stores), merchants (bookstores, mail catalog
companies), publishing companies (magazines, newspapers), organizations
(charities), financial institutions (banks, investment firms, credit card
companies), landlords, employers, and other entities (insurance companies,
security companies, travel agencies, car rental companies, hotels). Our
relationships with all of these entities generate records containing personal
information necessary to establish an account and record of our
transactions, preferences, purchases, and activities. We are becoming a
society of records, and these records are not held by us, but by third parties.
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In earlier times, communities were smaller and people knew each
other’s business. Today, the predominant mode of spreading information is
not through the flutter of gossiping tongues but through the language of
electricity, where information pulses between massive record systems and
databases. From the standpoint of individual freedom, this development
has both an upside and a downside. Individuals can more readily escape
from the curious eyes of the community, freeing themselves from stifling
social norms inhibiting individuality and creativity. On the other hand, an
ever-growing series of records is created about almost every facet of a
person’s life.
These record systems are becoming increasingly useful to law
enforcement officials. Personal information can help the government
detect fraud, espionage, fugitives, smuggling cartels, drug distribution
rings, and terrorist cells. Information about a person’s financial
transactions, purchases, and religious and political beliefs can assist law
enforcement in investigating suspected criminals, individuals providing
money and assistance to terrorists, or profiling people for more thorough
searches at airports.20
The government, therefore, has compelling reasons to obtain personal
information found in records maintained by third parties that can reveal a
myriad of details about a person. For instance, from pen registers and trap
and trace devices, the government can obtain a list of all the phone
numbers dialed to or from a particular location, potentially revealing the
people with whom a person associates. From bank records, which contain
one’s account activity and check writing, the government can discover the
various companies and professionals that a person does business with (ISP,
telephone company, credit card company, magazine companies, doctors,
attorneys, and so on).21 Credit card company records can reveal where one
eats and shops and which cultural events one attends. The government can
obtain one’s travel destinations and activities from travel agent records.
From hotel records, it can discover the numbers a person dialed and the
pay-per-view movies a person watched.22 The government can potentially

20. See Robert O’Harrow, Jr., Intricate Screening of Flyers In Works: Database Raises Privacy
Concerns, WASH. POST., Feb. 1, 2002, at A1.
21. See Cal. Bankers Ass’n v. Shultz, 416 U.S. 21, 85 (1974) (Douglas, J. dissenting) (“In a sense
a person is defined by the checks he writes. By examining them the agents get to know his doctors,
lawyers, creditors, political allies, social connections, religious affiliation, educational interests, the
papers and magazines he reads, and so on ad infinitum.”).
22. See Dana Hawkins, Gospel of a Privacy Guru: Be Wary; Assume the Worst, U.S. NEWS &
WORLD REP., June 25, 2001, http://www.usnews.com/usnews/nycu/tech/articles/010625/
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obtain one’s thumbprint from car rental companies that collect them to
investigate fraud.23 From cable companies, the government can obtain a
list of the special pay channels subscribed to or the various pay-per-view
events a person has watched. From video stores, the government can
access an inventory of the videos that a person has rented.
The government can also glean a wealth of information from the
extensive records employers maintain about their employees.24 Employers
frequently monitor their employees.25 Some use Internet filter software to
track how employees surf the World Wide Web.26 Employers often keep
information about an employee’s e-mail use, including back-up copies of
the contents of e-mail. A number of employers also conduct drug testing,27
and many require prospective employees to answer questionnaires asking
about drug use, finances, mental health history, marital history, and
sexuality.28 Some even require prospective hires to take a psychological
screening test.29
Landlords are another fertile source of personal information.
Landlord records often contain financial, employment, and pet information,
in addition to any tenant complaints. Many landlords also maintain
logbooks at the front desk where visitors sign in. Some apartment

tech/privacy.htm (describing hotel chain sharing lists of the movies, including pornographic ones,
customers pay to watch in their hotel rooms).
23. Julia Scheeres, No Thumbprint, No Rental Car, WIRED NEWS, Nov. 21, 2001, at
http://wired.com/news/print/0,1294,48552,00.html.
24. See, e.g., Paul M. Schwartz, Beyond Lessig’s Code for Internet Privacy: Cyberspace Filters,
Privacy-Control, and the Fair Information Practices, 2000 WISC. L. REV. 743, 770–71 (describing lack
of employee privacy).
25. See Dana Hawkins, Digital Skulduggery, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Oct. 2, 2000 at 64. For
a detailed account of privacy in the workplace, see generally, JOHN D.R. CRAIG, PRIVACY AND
EMPLOYMENT LAW (1999).
26. J.C. Conklin, Under the Radar: Content Advisor Snoops as Workers Surf Web, WALL ST. J.,
Oct. 15, 1998, at B8.
27. See Baggs v. Eagle-Pitcher Indus., Inc., 750 F. Supp. 264, 272–73 (W.D. Mich. 1990)
(holding no tort or contract remedies for at-will employee discharged for refusing to take a drug test).
For an excellent discussion of the issue, see generally, Pauline T. Kim, Privacy Rights, Public Policy,
and the Employment Relationship, 57 OHIO ST. L.J. 671 (1996).
28. This information was requested in employer questionnaires in American Federation of
Government Employees v. HUD, 118 F.3d 786 (D.C. Cir. 1997) and Walls v. City of Petersburg, 895
F.2d 188 (4th Cir. 1990). The Americans With Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. § 12112 prevents
inquiries of an applicant regarding disabilities; however, inquiries can be made “into the ability of an
applicant to perform job related functions.” 42 U.S.C. § 12112(d)(2)(B) (2002). An employer may
require all entering employees to undergo a medical examination. § 12112(d)(3).
29. See Sarah Schafer, Searching for a Workable Fit; Employers Try Psychological Tests to Help
with More than the Right Hire, WASH. POST, Jan. 14, 1999, at V5.
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buildings use biometric identification devices, such as hand scanners, to
control access to common areas such as gyms.
Increasingly, companies and entities that we have never established
any contact with have dossiers about us. From credit reporting agencies,
the government can glean information relating to financial transactions,
debts, creditors, and checking accounts.30 The government can also find
out details about people’s race, income, opinions, political beliefs, health,
lifestyle, and purchasing habits from database companies, since many
companies keep extensive personal information on millions of
Americans.31 One database company maintains information about people’s
supermarket purchases, collected through the use of supermarket discount
cards. This data can reveal a complete inventory of one’s groceries, overthe-counter medications, hygiene supplies, and contraceptive devices,
among others.32
Beyond the records described above, the Internet has the potential to
become one of the government’s greatest information gathering tools.33
There are two significant aspects of the Internet that make it such a
revolutionary data collection device. First, it gives many individuals a false
sense of privacy. The secrecy and anonymity of the Internet is often a
mirage. People are rarely truly anonymous because ISPs keep records of a
subscriber’s screen name and pseudonyms.34 ISP account information can
also include the subscriber’s name, address, phone numbers, passwords,
information about web surfing sessions and durations, credit card and bank
account information.35
By learning a person’s screen name, the
government can identify the person behind the pseudonym postings to
newsgroups or chatrooms. For example, in McVeigh v. Cohen,36 AOL
30. See Solove, Privacy and Power, supra note 7, at 1408–09.
31. See id. at 1406–10.
32. Catalina Marketing Corp. has collected information about the supermarket purchases of thirty
million households. See Robert O’Harrow, Jr., Behind the Instant Coupons, a Data-Crunching
Powerhouse, WASH. POST., Dec. 31, 1998, at A20.
33. Although the rise of the Internet promises to herald a new age of freedom, there is a dark side
to the Internet, where instead of a world of freedom, it is becoming a realm of domination and control.
As Lawrence Lessig observes: “[C]yberspace does not guarantee its own freedom but instead carries an
extraordinary potential for control.” LESSIG, CODE, supra note 19, at 58.
34. See, e.g., United States v. Hambrick, 55 F. Supp. 2d 504, 505 (W.D. Va. 1999) (obtaining
from ISP the identity of a pseudonymous individual in an Internet chat room); United States v.
Charbonneau, 979 F. Supp. 1177, 1179 (S.D. Ohio 1997) (obtaining the identity of an pseudonymous
Internet user from ISP); State v. Schroeder, 613 N.W.2d 911, 913 (Wis. Ct. App. 2000) (obtaining from
ISP the identity of individual who posted sexually suggestive comments on the Internet about another
individual).
35. See 18 U.S.C. § 2703(c) (2000), as amended by the USA-PATRIOT Act §§ 210–11.
36. 983 F. Supp. 215, 217 (D.D.C. 1998).
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provided a Navy official with the identity of an individual using a
pseudonym who indicated he was gay and worked in the military. Based
on this information, the Navy proceeded to initiate discharge proceedings
under the “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” policy.37
A person’s ISP can also keep records about websurfing and e-mail
activity. At the government’s request, an ISP can keep logs of the e-mail
addresses with which a person corresponds. Further, the government can
use ISP information to find out who uses a particular e-mail address. Thus,
it can discover the identities of the individuals with whom a person
corresponds. Further, if a person stores e-mail that is sent and received
with the ISP, the government can obtain the contents of those e-mails.
Second, the Internet is unprecedented in the degree of detailed
information that can be gathered and stored. It is one of the most powerful
generators of records in human history. Jerry Kang notes that as we
wander through cyberspace, a host of entities assemble information that is
“detailed, computer-processable, indexed to the individual, and
permanent.”38 For example, as more information goes digital, and as
copyright holders seek new ways to profit from their copyrights, the
technological tools are in place to monitor the music people listen to and
the books people read.39
Websites often accumulate a great deal of information about their
users. Through the use of a “cookie,” which identifies a user by deploying
a text file into the user’s computer, websites can detect the previous
website and parts of the site a user accessed.40 This data is called
“clickstream data” because it records nearly every click of the mouse.41
Another information collection device, known as a “web bug,” involves
hidden pixel tags secretly planted on a user’s hard drive that surreptitiously

37. When he called AOL, the official did not identify himself as a Navy official but instead
stated that he had received a fax from a pseudonymous individual and that he wanted to find out the
identity of the individual. The AOL representative identified the individual.
38. Jerry Kang, Information Privacy in Cyberspace Transactions, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1193, 1199
(1998).
39. See Julie E. Cohen, The Right to Read Anonymously: A Closer Look at “Copyright
Management” in Cyberspace, 28 CONN. L. REV. 981, 983 (1996) (“The same technologies that enable
readers to access digitally stored works, however, also will enable copyright owners to generate precise
and detailed records of such access.”); Schwartz, Internet Privacy and the State, supra note 6, at 849
(noting that copyright management “systems enable copyrighted works themselves to carry out a
pervasive monitoring of individual activity”). See also Pamela Samuelson, Will the Copyright Office
Be Obsolete in the Twenty-First Century?, 13 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 58 (1994).
40. See Solove, Privacy and Power, supra note 7, at 1411–12.
41. See id. at 1411.
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gather data about the user.42 Websites also collect data when people fill out
online questionnaires pertaining to their hobbies, health, and interests.
Further, a person’s Internet postings are archived and do not readily
disappear.43 As we invest more time on the Internet, strangers and
unfamiliar organizations are keeping permanent records about our lives.
Thus, the government can glean a substantial amount of information
about visitors to a particular website. For example, certain heath websites
ask individuals to fill out questionnaires about their symptoms to determine
whether they have a disease.44 Other websites have questionnaires relating
to psychology and personality.45 From Internet retailers, the government
can learn about the books, videos, music, and electronics that one
purchases. Some Internet retailers, such as “Amazon.com,” record all the
purchases a person makes throughout the many years that the person has
been shopping on the website. Also, retailers use surveys to identify how a
person rates books and videos.46 Based on this information, the
government can discover a consumer’s interests, sexuality, political views,
religious beliefs, and lifestyle. Further, if a person buys a gift from an
Internet retailer and has it mailed to a friend, the government may learn the
friend’s name and address and develop a list of an individual’s friends and
acquaintances.
The government may also obtain information from websites that
operate personalized home pages. Home pages enable users to keep track
of the stocks they own, favorite television channels, airfares for favorite
destinations, and news of interest.47 Other websites, such as Microsoft
Network’s calendar service, allow users to maintain their daily schedule
and appointments.48 Further, there are some database companies that
amass extensive profiles of people’s websurfing habits.49

42. See Robert O’Harrow, Jr., Fearing a Plague of ‘Web Bugs’; Invisible Fact-Gathering Code
Raises Privacy Concerns, WASH. POST, Nov. 13, 1999, at E1; Leslie Walker, Bugs That Go Through
Computer Screens, WASH. POST, Mar. 15, 2001, at E1.
43. J.D. Lasica, The Net NEVER Forgets, SALON, Nov. 25, 1998, at
http://www.salon.com/21st/feature/1998/11/25feature.html.
44. For a discussion of the types of information collected by health websites, see Pew Internet &
American Life Project, Exposed Online: Why the New Federal Health Privacy Regulation Doesn’t
Offer Much Protection to Internet Users (Nov. 2001), at http://www.pewinternet.org.
45. Id.
46. This feature is available on Amazon.com at http://www.amazon.com.
47. For example, Yahoo!, at http://www.yahoo.com, offers a personalized web page service.
48. See http://calendar.msn.com/CalendarNorm.html.
49. See JIM STERNE, WHAT MAKES PEOPLE CLICK: ADVERTISING ON THE WEB, 238–41 (1997);
Solove, Privacy and Power, surpa note 7, at 1412.
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While life in the Information Age has brought us a dizzying amount of
information, it has also placed a profound amount of information about our
lives in the hands of numerous entities. These digital dossiers are
increasingly becoming digital biographies, a horde of aggregated bits of
information combined to reveal a portrait of who we are based upon what
we buy, the organizations we belong to, how we navigate the Internet, and
which shows and videos we watch.50 This information is not held by
trusted friends or family members, but by large bureaucracies that we do
not know very well or sometimes do not even know at all.
B. GOVERNMENT-PRIVATE SECTOR INFORMATION FLOWS
Information is becoming more fluid and more readily collected,
stored, transferred, and combined with other information. This increasing
movement of information is frequently called “information flow.”51
Elsewhere, I have discussed the problems of information flow among
various private sector entities52 as well as from the government to the
private sector.53 There is another problematic type of information flow that
is rapidly escalating—data transfers from the private sector to the
government.
The government is increasingly contracting with private sector entities
to acquire databases of personal information. Database firms are willing to
supply the information and the government is willing to pay for it.54 For
example, the private sector company ChoicePoint, Inc. has multimillion
dollar contracts with about thirty-five federal agencies including the
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and the Internal Revenue Service
(IRS) to provide personal information.55 ChoicePoint’s database contains
over ten billion records indexed by Social Security numbers. The
information is gathered from public records, private detectives, credit
reporting agencies, and other sources.56

50. See Daniel J. Solove, Access and Aggregation: Privacy, Public Records, and the
Constitution, 86 MINN. L. REV. (forthcoming 2002).
51. See generally Joel R. Reidenberg, Resolving Conflicting International Data Privacy Rules in
Cyberspace, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1315 (2000); Joel R. Reidenberg, Setting Standards for Fair Information
Practice in the U.S. Private Sector, 80 IOWA L. REV. 497 (1995).
52. See generally Solove, Privacy and Power, supra note 7.
53. See generally Solove, Access and Aggregation, supra note 50.
54. FED. TRADE COMM’N, INDIVIDUAL REFERENCE SERVICES 1, 27–28 (1997), available at 1997
WL 784156, at *9.
55. See Glenn R. Simpson, Big Brother-in-Law: If the FBI Hopes to Get the Goods on You, It
May Ask ChoicePoint, WALL ST. J., Apr. 13, 2001, at A1.
56. See id.
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The Department of Defense allegedly has purchased information
collected by a private sector company about students’ web surfing habits.57
Thus far, the agency has only obtained aggregate information, but in light
of the events of September 11, there might be a strong interest in acquiring
personally identifiable information about students’ web searching habits
because some of the terrorists posed as students.
A second form of information flow from the private sector to the
government emerges when the government requests private sector records
for particular investigations or compels their disclosure by subpoena or
court order. Voluntary disclosure of customer information is within the
third party company’s discretion.58 Further, whether a person is notified of
the request and given the opportunity to challenge it in court is also within
the company’s discretion.59
The September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks have changed the climate for
private sector-to-government information flows.
Law enforcement
officials have a greater desire to obtain information that could be helpful in
identifying terrorists or their supporters, including information about what
people read, with whom they associate, their religion, and their lifestyle.
Following the September 11 attack, the FBI simply has requested records
from businesses without a subpoena, warrant, or court order.60 Recently,
Attorney General John Ashcroft has revised longstanding guidelines for
FBI surveillance practices. Under the previous version, the FBI could
monitor public events and mine the Internet for information only when
“facts or circumstances reasonably indicate that a federal crime has been, is
being, or will be committed.”61 Under the revised version, the FBI can
engage in these types of information gathering without any requirement
that this gathering be part of a legitimate investigation or related in any
manner to criminal wrongdoing.62 The FBI can now collect “publicly
available information, whether obtained directly or through services or
resources (whether nonprofit or commercial) that compile or analyze such

57. See Jeffrey Benner, The Army is Watching Your Kid, WIRED NEWS, Jan. 29, 2001, at
http://www.wired.com/news/print/0,1294,41476,00.html.
58. See infra Part IV.
59. See infra Part IV.
60. Daniela Deane, Legal Niceties Aside . . . ; Federal Agents Without Subpoenas Asking Firms
for Records, WASH. POST, Nov. 7, 2001, at E1.
61. THE ATTORNEY GENERAL’S GUIDELINES ON GENERAL CRIMES, RACKETEERING ENTERPRISE
AND DOMESTIC SECURITY/TERRORISM INVESTIGATIONS § II.C.1 (March 21, 1989).
62. See THE ATTORNEY GENERAL’S GUIDELINES ON GENERAL CRIMES, RACKETEERING
ENTERPRISE AND TERRORISM ENTERPRISE INVESTIGATIONS § VI (May 30, 2002).
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information; and information voluntarily provided by private entities.”63
Further, the FBI can “carry out general topical research, including
conducting online searches and accessing online sites and forums.”64
In conjunction with the government’s greater desire for personal
information, the private sector has become more willing to supply it.
Before September 11, the private sector, in certain circumstances, strongly
opposed sharing information with the government. For example, when
Independent Counsel Kenneth Starr subpoenaed a Washington, D.C.
bookstore’s records of Monica Lewinsky’s purchases,65 the store spent over
$100,000 in legal costs vigorously opposing the subpoena.66 In March of
2000, the Tattered Cover, a bookstore in Denver, Colorado, contested a
search warrant in order to protect its customers’ privacy.67 Prior to
September 11, an attorney for Amazon.com revealed that law enforcement
officials informally requested information about book, music, and video
purchases. Amazon.com “typically” informed law enforcement officials
that it valued its customers’ privacy, it would not disclose their
information, albeit with some exceptions.68
September 11 changed these attitudes. Background check companies,
for instance, experienced a large boost in business after September 11.69
An Internet company shut down its free anonymous Internet surfing

63. Id.
64. Id. at VI.B.1. See also Susan Schmidt & Dan Eggen, FBI Given More Latitude: New
Surveillance Rules Remove Evidence Hurdle, WASH. POST, May 30, 2002, at A1.
65. In particular, Starr was interested in discovering if Lewinsky had purchased Nicholson
Barker’s Vox, a novel that pertained to phone sex. See Mike Feinsilber, Bookstore Refuses to Comply
with Starr’s Subpoena for Lewinsky Book List, NANDO TIMES NEWS (1998),
http://archive.nandotimes.com/newsroom/nt/529nonono.html.
66. See id.
67. Felicity Barringer, Using Books as Evidence Against Their Readers, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 8,
2001, at WK3; Justin Rickard, Police vs. Bookstore in Privacy Rights Case, (Dec. 16, 2000), at
http://www.privacyfoundation.org/resources/bookstore.asp. See also Our Books Are Our Business,
ABCNEWS.COM, at http://my.abcnews.go.com/2020_020216_bookstores_feature.htm. The technique
of obtaining information from bookstores has escalated since the Monica Lewinsky episode. In 2000–
01, prior to September 11, Borders bookstores in Massachusetts and Kansas were searched and
subpoenaed. See Barringer, supra, at WK3. In the Tattered Cover case, the Colorado Supreme Court
recently sided with the bookstore. See Tattered Cover, Inc. v. City of Thornton, 44 P.3d 1044 (Colo.
2002).
68. Barringer, supra note 67.
69. Lisa Guernsey, What Did You Do Before the War?, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 22, 2001, at G1. See
also Victor Schachter & Trey Wichmann, The Aftermath of September 11: No Longer Business as
Usual for Security, Safety to Privacy in the Workplace, in THIRD ANNUAL INSTITUTE PRIVACY LAW:
NEW DEVELOPMENTS & ISSUES IN A SECURITY CONSCIOUS WORLD 623, 627 (Francoise Gilbert, John
B. Kennedy & Paul M. Schwartz eds. 2002) (describing increase in employer scrutiny of applicants’
backgrounds).
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service.70 Several large financial companies developed agreements to
provide information to federal law enforcement agencies.71
Indeed, in times of crisis or when serious crimes are at issue, the
incentives to disclose information to the government are quite significant.
Companies do not want to withhold information that will impede the
investigation of a terrorist or murderer. They want to cooperate and help
out.72
When private sector entities refuse to cooperate, the government can
compel production of the information by issuing a subpoena or obtaining a
court order. As discussed in Part IV, these devices are very different from
warrants because they offer little protection to the individual being
investigated. Notification of the target of the investigation is often within
the discretion of the third party.73 Further, it is up to the third party to
challenge the subpoena.74 So, rather than spend the money and resources
to challenge the subpoena, especially when the information is not valuable
to their interests, companies can simply turn it over or permit the
government to search their records.
Moreover, ISPs are integral to law enforcement officials’ ability to
investigate. Since September 11, AOL and Earthlink, two of the largest
ISPs, have readily cooperated with the investigation of the terrorist
attacks.75
Often, ISPs have their own technology to turn over
communications and information about targets of investigations. If they
lack the technology, law enforcement officials can install devices such as
“Carnivore” to locate the information.76 Carnivore, now renamed to the
more innocuous “DCS1000,” is a computer program installed by the FBI at

70. Elinor Mills Abreu, SafeWeb Shuts Free Anonymous Web Service, INFOWAR.COM, Nov. 11,
2001, at http://www.infowar.com/class_1/01/class1_112001a_j.shtml.
71. See Paul Beckett, Big Banks, U.S. Weigh Pooling Data on Terror, WALL ST. J., Nov. 26,
2001, at A2; Robert O’Harrow, Jr., Financial Database to Screen Accounts: Joint Effort Targets
Suspicious Activities, WASH. POST, May 30, 2002, at E1.
72. See David E. Rosenbaum, A Nation Challenged: Questions of Confidentiality, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 22, 2001, at B7.
73. See infra Part IV.
74. See infra Part IV.
75. See Mike Snider, Privacy Advocates Fear Trade-Off for Security; FBI Sends Warrants to
Service Providers, USA TODAY, Sept. 13, 2001, at D8.
76. See Robert Lemos, FBI Taps ISPs in Hunt for Attackers, ZD NET Sept. 12, 2001, at
http://zdnet.com/filters/printerfriendly/0,6061,5096919–2,00.html.

SOLO10.DOC

2002]

9/3/02 8:49 AM

DISSIPATION OF FOURTH AMENDMENT PRIVACY

1099

an ISP.77 It can monitor all ISP e-mail traffic and search for certain
keywords in the content or headers of the e-mail messages.78
These developments are troubling because private sector companies
often have weak policies governing when information may be disclosed to
the government. The privacy policy for the MSN network, an affiliation of
several Microsoft, Inc. websites such as Hotmail (an e-mail service),
Health, Money, Newsletters, eShop, and Calendar, states:
MSN Web sites will disclose your personal information, without notice,
only if required to do so by law or in the good faith belief that such
action is necessary to: (a) conform to the edicts of the law or comply
with legal process served on Microsoft or the site. . . .79

Though somewhat unclear, this privacy policy appears to require a
subpoena or court order for the government to obtain personal data.
Amazon.com’s privacy policy reads, “We release account and other
personal information when we believe release is appropriate to comply
with law . . . or protect the rights, property, or safety of Amazon.com, our
users, or others.”80 It is unclear from this policy the extent to which
Amazon.com, in its discretion, can provide information to law enforcement
officials.
EBay, a popular online auction website, has a policy stating that
[it] cooperates with law enforcement inquiries, as well as other third
parties to enforce laws, such as: intellectual property rights, fraud and
other rights. We can (and you authorize us to) disclose any information
about you to law enforcement or other government officials as we, in our
sole discretion, believe necessary or appropriate, in connection with an
investigation of fraud, intellectual property infringements, or other
activity that is illegal or may expose us or you to legal liability.81

This policy gives eBay almost complete discretion to provide the
government with whatever information it deems appropriate.
Truste.com, a nonprofit organization providing a “trustmark” for
participating websites that agree to abide by certain privacy principles, has
drafted a model privacy statement that reads, “We will not sell, share, or
77. E. Judson Jennings, Carnivore: U.S. Government Surveillance of Internet Transmissions, 6
VA. J. L. & TECH. 10, ¶¶ 49, 96 (2001).
78. The USA-PATRIOT Act enshrined the FBI’s Carnivore device into law. USA-PATRIOT Act
§ 216, codified at 18 U.S.C. § 3133(a)(3) (1994).
79. MSN Statement of Privacy, at http://privacy.msn.com.
80. Amazon.com Privacy Notice, at http://www.amazon.com.
81. Privacy Policy, at http://pages.ebay.com/help/community/png-priv.html.
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rent [personal] information to others in ways different from what is
disclosed in this statement.”82 This policy, however, does not contain any
provision about supplying information to the government, and the quoted
statement appears to be referring to other private sector entities such as
marketers.83 Further, the policy does not inform people that under existing
law, information must be disclosed to the government pursuant to a
subpoena or court order.84
The government is also increasing information flow from the private
sector by encouraging it to develop new information-gathering
technologies. Private sector firms stand to profit from developing such
technologies. Recently, private sector companies have expressed an
eagerness to develop national identification systems and face-recognition
technology.85 In addition, the federal government has announced a “wish
list” for new surveillance and investigation technologies.86 Companies that
invent such technologies can obtain lucrative government contracts.
The government has also funded private sector information-gathering
initiatives. For instance, a company that began assembling a national
database of photographs and personal information as a tool to guard against
consumer fraud has received $1.5 million from the Secret Service to aid in
the development of the database.87
In certain circumstances, where the private sector is not a willing
collaborator with the government, new laws require their participation. For
example, the Bank Secrecy Act of 1970 requires banks to maintain records
of financial transactions to facilitate law enforcement needs, in particular,
investigations and prosecutions of criminal, tax, or regulatory matters.88
Congress passed the Act out of concern that the computerization of records
would complicate white-collar crime prosecutions.89 Under the Act, all
federally insured banks must maintain records of each account holder’s
financial transactions. Furthermore, the Secretary of the Treasury is
82. Model Privacy Statement, at http://truste.com/bus/pub_sample.html.
83. See id.
84. See id.
85. For example, Larry Ellison, the CEO of Oracle Corporation, proposed a system of national
identification involving biometrics. See Larry Ellison, Digital IDs Can Help Prevent Terrorism, WALL
ST. J., Oct. 8, 2001, at A26.
86. See Greg Schneider & Robert O’Harrow, Jr., Pentagon Makes Rush Order for Anti-Terror
Technology, WASH. POST, Oct. 26, 2001, at A10.
87. Robert O’Harrow, Jr., Drivers Angered over Firm’s Purchase of Photos, WASH. POST, Jan.
28, 1999, at E1; Robert O’Harrow, Jr. & Liz Leyden, U.S. Helped Fund Photo Database of Driver IDs:
Firm’s Plan Seen as Way to Fight Identity Crime, WASH. POST, Feb. 18, 1999, at A1.
88. 31 U.S.C. § 1081 (1994).
89. H. JEFF SMITH, MANAGING PRIVACY 24 (1994).
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authorized to require that certain domestic financial transactions be reported
to the government.90 Under regulations promulgated by the Secretary of the
Treasury, a bank must report every financial transaction in excess of
$10,000.91
In addition, Congress has passed the Personal Responsibility and
Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 to assist with investigations
of parents who do not pay child support. It requires that employers collect
personal information from all new employees including Social Security
numbers, addresses, and wages.92
Congress has also passed the Communications Assistance for Law
Enforcement Act (CALEA) of 1994,93 which requires telecommunications
service providers to develop technology to assist government surveillance of
individuals.94
All of this suggests that businesses and government have become
allies. When their interests diverge, new laws requiring cooperation are
passed. We are increasingly seeing collusion, partly voluntary, partly
coerced, between the private sector and the government.
C. THE DANGERS OF GOVERNMENT INFORMATION GATHERING
Although there are certainly many legitimate needs for law
enforcement officials to obtain personal data, there are also many dangers
to unfettered government access to information. There are at least three
general types of harms. The first has been discussed under the rubric of the
“Big Brother metaphor.”95 Big Brother is the totalitarian government in
George Orwell’s Nineteen Eighty-Four, which achieved total domination
by monitoring every facet of its citizens’ private lives.96 Although
elsewhere it is suggested that the Big Brother metaphor does not capture
the problem of the collection and use of personal information by private

90. 31 U.S.C. § 1081.
91. See 31 C.F.R. § 103.22(1). In California Bankers Association v. Shultz, 416 U.S. 21, 67–69
(1974), the Court held that the bankers lacked standing to challenge the regulations. Shultz effectively
resolved the Fourth Amendment rights of the individuals with accounts at the bank. Id. According to the
third party doctrine, these individuals have no reasonable expectation of privacy in their bank records. Id.
92. See Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, Pub. L. No.
104–193, 110 Stat. 2105 (1996). See generally Robert O’ Harrow, Jr., Uncle Sam Has All Your
Numbers, WASH. POST, June 27,1999, at A1.
93. Pub. L. 103-414, 108 Stat. 4279 (1994).
94. See United States Telecom Ass’n v. FCC, 227 F.3d 450, 454 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
95. See Solove, Privacy and Power, supra note 7, at 1393.
96. See generally GEORGE ORWELL, NINETEEN EIGHTY-FOUR (1949).
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sector entities,97 it certainly remains persuasive in the context of
government information-gathering.
Indeed, historically, totalitarian
governments have developed elaborate systems for collecting data about
people’s private lives.98 Although the possibility of the rise of a totalitarian
state is remote, if our society takes on certain totalitarian features, it could
significantly increase the extent to which the government can exercise
social control.
Second, government information-gathering can severely constrain
democracy and individual self-determination. Paul Schwartz illustrates this
with his theory of “constitutive privacy.”99 According to Schwartz, privacy
is essential to both individuals and communities: “[C]onstitutive privacy
seeks to create boundaries about personal information to help the individual
and define terms of life within the community.”100 As a form of regulation
of information flow, privacy shapes “the extent to which certain actions or
expressions of identity are encouraged or discouraged.”101 Schwartz
contends that extensive government oversight over an individual’s
activities can “corrupt individual decision making about the elements of
one’s identity.”102 Further, inadequate protection of privacy threatens
deliberative democracy by inhibiting people from engaging in democratic
activities.103 This can occur unintentionally; even if government entities
are not attempting to engage in social control, their activities can have
collateral effects that harm democracy and self-determination.
For example, government information-collection interferes with an
individual’s freedom of association. The Court has held that there is a
“vital relationship between freedom to associate and privacy in one’s
associations.”104 In a series of cases, the Court has restricted the
government’s ability to compel disclosure of membership in an
organization.105 In Baird v. State Bar,106 for example, the Court has
declared: “[W]hen a State attempts to make inquiries about a person’s
97. See Solove, Privacy and Power, supra note 7, at 1417–19.
98. See Margaret Raymond, Rejecting Totalitarianism: Translating the Guarantees of
Constitutional Criminal Procedure, 76 N.C. L. REV. 1193, 1198 (1998).
99. See Schwartz, Privacy and Democracy in Cyberspace, supra note 6, at 1658–59.
100. Id. at 1664.
101. Id. at 1665.
102. Id. at 1657.
103. See id. at 1651–52.
104. NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 462 (1958).
105. See, e.g., Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 489 (1960) (holding unconstitutional a law
requiring teachers to disclose membership in organizations); NAACP, 357 U.S. at 466 (restricting
compelled disclosure of membership lists of NAACP).
106. 401 U.S. 1 (1971).
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beliefs or associations, its power is limited by the First Amendment. Broad
and sweeping state inquiries into these protected areas . . . discourage
citizens from exercising rights protected by the Constitution.”107 The
government’s extensive ability to glean information about one’s
associations from third party records without any Fourth Amendment
limitations seems to present an end-run around the principles articulated in
these cases.108
Extensive government information-gathering from third party records
also implicates the right to speak anonymously. In Talley v. California,109
the Court struck down a law prohibiting the distribution of anonymous
handbills as a violation of the First Amendment. The Court held that
“[p]ersecuted groups and sects from time to time throughout history have
been able to criticize oppressive practices and laws either anonymously or
not at all.”110 Further, the Court reasoned, “identification and fear of
reprisal might deter perfectly peaceful discussions of public matters of
importance.”111 The Court reiterated its view of the importance of
protecting anonymous speech in McIntyre v. Ohio Elections
Commission.112 The Court declared that “an author’s decision to remain
anonymous, like other decisions concerning omissions or additions to the
content of a publication, is an aspect of the freedom of speech protected by
the First Amendment.”113 These cases, however, restricted the government
from requiring individuals to identify themselves when speaking. With
government information-gathering from third parties, namely ISPs, the
government can readily obtain an anonymous or pseudonymous speaker’s
identity. Only computer-savvy users can speak with more secure
anonymity. When private parties attempt to obtain the identifying
information, courts have held that subpoenas for this information must
contain heightened standards.114 However, no such heightened standards
apply when the government seeks to obtain the information.

107. Id. at 6.
108. It is unclear how receptive the Court will be to this argument. The Court has held that mere
information gathering about a group’s public activities did not harm First Amendment interests enough
to give rise to standing. See Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1, 12–15 (1972).
109. 362 U.S. 60, 63–64 (1960).
110. Id. at 64.
111. Id. at 65.
112. 514 U.S. 334, 334 (1995).
113. Id. at 342.
114. See, e.g., Doe v. 2TheMart.com, Inc., 140 F.Supp.2d 1088, 1093–95 (W.D. Wash. 2001);
Columbia Insurance Co. v. Seescandy.com, 185 F.R.D. 573, 578–80 (N.D. Cal. 1999).
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Further, beyond typical anonymity is the ability to receive information
anonymously. As Julie Cohen persuasively contends: “The freedom to
read anonymously is just as much a part of our tradition, and the choice of
reading materials just as expressive of identity, as the decision to use or
withhold one’s name.”115
The lack of sufficient controls on the
government’s obtaining the extensive records about how individuals surf
the web, the books and magazines they read, and the videos or television
channels they listen to can implicate this interest.116
Additionally, the increasing information flow between the private
sector and the government not only implicates the privacy of the target of
an investigation, but can also affect the privacy of other individuals. The
names, addresses, phone numbers, and a variety of data about a number of
individuals can be ensnared in third party records pertaining to the target.
A third type of danger promoted by government information-gathering
consists of the harms routinely arising in bureaucratic settings: decisions
without adequate accountability, dangerous pockets of unfettered
discretion, and choices based on short-term goals without consideration of
the long-term consequences or the larger social effects. For example, this
can lead to dangers such as hasty judgment in times of crisis, the disparate
impact of law enforcement on particular minorities, cover-ups, petty
retaliation for criticism, blackmail, framing, sweeping and disruptive
investigations, racial, ethnic, or religious profiling, and so on. As David
Garrow aptly observes:
I always had been much impressed by Joseph Conrad’s message in The
Heart of Darkness. I have come to feel, however, that the true nature of
evil is much more akin to that described by Hannah Arendt than to

115. Cohen, supra note 39, at 1012.
116. Recently, the Colorado Supreme Court in Tattered Cover, Inc. v. City of Thornton, 44 P.3d
1044, 1044 (Colo. 2002), concluded that heightened scrutiny should apply to instances where police use
a search warrant to seek records of a person’s book purchases at bookstores. The holding was premised
under Colorado’s constitution:
We turn to our Colorado Constitution, which we now hold requires a more substantial
justification from the government than is required by the Fourth Amendment of the United
States Constitution when law enforcement officials attempt to use a search warrant to obtain
an innocent, third-party bookstore’s customer purchase records.
Id. at 1056. The court’s holding was premised on a recognition that police searches of bookstores could
chill bookstore customers’ First Amendment rights to read anonymously: “When a person buys a book
at a bookstore, he engages in activity protected by the First Amendment because he is exercising his
right to read and receive ideas and information. Any governmental action that interferes with the
willingness of customers to purchase books, or booksellers to sell books, thus implicates First
Amendment concerns.” Id. at 1052. The court concluded that “law enforcement officials must
demonstrate a sufficiently compelling need for the specific customer purchase record sought from the
innocent, third-party bookstore.” Id. at 1058.
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Conrad’s horror. The danger we all face is not the consequences of man
unbound from the restraints of society. It is the surrender of independent
and critical judgment by people who work in large organizations. Evil is
far more the product of people in complex institutions acting without
personal reflection than it is something inherent in individual man.117

The most frequent problem is not that law enforcement agencies will
be lead by corrupt and abusive leaders, although this arguably happened to
some degree for nearly fifty years when J. Edgar Hoover directed the
FBI.118 The problem is the risk that judgment will not be exercised in a
careful and thoughtful manner. In other words, it stems from certain forms
of government information-gathering shifting power toward a bureaucratic
machinery that is poorly regulated and susceptible to abuse. This shift has
profound social effects because it alters the balance of power between the
government and the people, exposing individuals to a series of harms,
increasing their vulnerability and decreasing the degree of power that they
exercise over their lives.
As police forces grew in size, number, and technological surveillance
capabilities, the relationship between government and citizen transformed.
When the Fourth Amendment was ratified, organized police forces did not
exist.119 Colonial policing was “[the] business of amateurs.”120 Sheriffs
did not have a professional staff, and relied heavily on ordinary citizens to
serve as constables or watchmen, whose primary duties consisted of
patrolling rather than investigating.121 The government typically became
involved in criminal investigations only after an arrest was made or a
suspect was identified.122 In ordinary criminal cases, police rarely
conducted searches prior to arrest.123
Organized police forces developed during the nineteenth century, and
by the middle of the twentieth century, policing reached an unprecedented
level of organization and coordination.124 At the center of the rise of
117.
118.

DAVID J. GARROW, THE FBI AND MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR. 18 (1980).
See generally CURT GENTRY, J. EDGAR HOOVER: THE MAN AND THE SECRETS (1991);
RICHARD GID POWERS, SECRECY AND POWER: THE LIFE OF J. EDGAR HOOVER (1987).
119. See Silas J. Wasserstrom & Louis Michael Seidman, The Fourth Amendment as
Constitutional Theory, 77 GEO. L.J. 19, 82 (1988); William J. Stuntz, The Substantive Origins of
Criminal Procedure, 105 YALE L.J. 393, 408 (1995).
120. LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN AMERICAN HISTORY 27 (1993).
121. Carol S. Steiker, Second Thoughts About First Principles, 107 HARV. L. REV. 820, 830–31
(1994).
122. See Stuntz, supra note 119, at 401.
123. See id.
124. See, e.g., FRIEDMAN, supra note 120, at 67; DAVID R. JOHNSON, POLICING THE URBAN
UNDERWORLD: THE IMPACT OF CRIME ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE AMERICAN POLICE 1800–1887,
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modern law enforcement was the development of the FBI. When the FBI
was being formed in 1908, there was significant opposition in Congress to
a permanent federal police force.125 Members of Congress expressed
trepidation over the possibility that such an investigatory agency could
ascertain “matters of scandal and gossip” that could wind up being used for
political purposes.126 These concerns related to the potential dangers of the
agency’s information-gathering capabilities, and as will be discussed later,
the fears became realities during the course of the FBI’s history.
Today, we live in an endless matrix of law and regulation,
administered by a multitude of vast government bureaucracies. Like most
everything else in modern society, law enforcement has become
bureaucratized.127
There are large police departments armed with
sophisticated technology that coordinate with each other.128 There are
massive agencies devoted entirely to investigation and intelligence. As
William Stuntz notes, “The problem of discretionary, suspicionless
searches and seizures in ordinary criminal cases is an incident of organized
police forces—of a system that gives to police officers the job of
investigating crimes, identifying suspects, and choosing which suspects to
pursue.”129
Many factors make it difficult for law enforcement officials to strike
the delicate balance between order and liberty. Among them, there are
tremendous pressures on law enforcement agencies to capture criminals,
solve notorious crimes, keep crime under control, and prevent acts of
violence and terrorism. This highly stressful environment can lead to short
cuts, bad exercises of discretion, or obliviousness and insensitivity to
people’s freedom. One of the most crucial aspects of keeping government
power under control is a healthy scrutiny. Most law enforcement officials,
however, are unlikely to view themselves with distrust and skepticism.
at 9 (1979); ERIC MONKKONEN, POLICE IN URBAN AMERICA, 1860–1920, at 42–44 (1981); Stuntz,
supra note 119, at 435.
125. GENTRY, supra note 118, at 112. The organization created in 1908 was called the Bureau of
Investigation (BI); it became the FBI in 1935. See id. at 113.
126. Id. at 111–12.
127. See, e.g., Albert J. Reiss, Jr., Police Organization in the Twentieth Century, in MODERN
POLICING 51, 68–82 (Michael Tonry & Norval Morris eds., 1992). Reiss points out that one of the
distinctive and unique facets of law enforcement bureaucracy in the United States “is that the greatest
discretionary powers are lodged with the lowest-ranking officials in the system and that most
discretionary decisions are not made a matter of record.” Id. at 74.
128. See, e.g., WHITFIELD DIFFIE & SUSAN LANDAU, PRIVACY ON THE LINE: THE POLITICS OF
WIRETAPPING AND ENCRYPTION 118 (1998) (“Police forces today not only have access to nationwide
(and often worldwide) records, but much of that access is directly available to officers in the field.”).
129. See Stuntz, supra note 119, at 408.

SOLO10.DOC

2002]

9/3/02 8:49 AM

DISSIPATION OF FOURTH AMENDMENT PRIVACY

1107

Police and prosecutors are too enveloped in the tremendous responsibilities
and pressures of their jobs to maintain an unbiased and balanced
perspective.
In short, one need not fear the rise of a totalitarian state or the
inhibition of democratic activities to desire strong controls on the power of
the government in collecting personal information.
Specifically,
government information-gathering must be regulated for a number of
reasons.
First, by obtaining private sector records, the government can conduct
the type of “fishing expeditions” that the Framers feared.130 The
government can increasingly amass vast dossiers on millions of
individuals, conduct sweeping investigations, and search for vast quantities
of information from a wide range of sources, without any probable cause or
particularized suspicion. Information is easier to obtain, and it is becoming
more centralized. Our digital dossiers are beginning to resemble digital
biographies that are increasingly flowing to the government. As Justice
Douglas noted in his dissent when the Court upheld the constitutionality of
the Bank Secrecy Act:
These [bank records] are all tied to one’s social security number; and
now that we have the data banks, these other items will enrich that
storehouse and make it possible for a bureaucrat—by pushing one
button—to get in an instant the names of the 190 million Americans who
are subversives or potential and likely candidates.131

Second, as more private sector data becomes available to the
government, there could be a de facto national database, or a large database
of “suspicious” individuals.132
Federal governmental entities have
conducted substantial information-gathering efforts on political groups
throughout the twentieth century. From 1940 through 1973, for example,
the FBI and CIA conducted a secret domestic intelligence operation,
reading the mail of thousands of citizens.133 The FBI’s investigations
extended to members of the women’s liberation movement and prominent
critics of the Vietnam War, and the FBI obtained information about
130. It is virtually undisputed that one of the central reasons the Framers created the Fourth
Amendment was to guard against the use of general warrants. See, e.g., LEONARD W. LEVY, ORIGINS
OF THE BILL OF RIGHTS 158 (1999); Tracey Maclin, When the Cure for the Fourth Amendment Is Worse
than the Disease, 68 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 9 (1994).
131. California Bankers Ass’n v. Shultz, 416 U.S. 21, 85 (1974) (Douglas, J. dissenting).
132. For a discussion of the harms of a national identification system, see Richard Sobel, The
Degradation of Political Identity Under a National Identification System, 8 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 37
(2002). See also Solove, Access and Aggregation, supra note 50.
133. DIFFIE & LANDAU, supra note 128, at 138.
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personal and sexual relationships that could be used to discredit them.134
During the McCarthy era and the 1980s, the FBI sought information from
libraries about the reading habits of certain individuals.135 Between 1967
and 1970, the U.S. Army conducted wide-ranging surveillance, amassing
extensive personal information about a broad group of individuals.136 The
impetus for the Army’s surveillance was a series of riots that followed Dr.
Martin Luther King, Jr.’s assassination.137 The information collected
involved data about finances, sexual activity, and health.138 In 1970,
Congress significantly curtailed the Army’s program, and the records of
personal information were eventually destroyed.139 The danger of these
information-gathering efforts is not only that it chills speech or threatens
lawful protest, but also that it makes people more vulnerable by exposing
them to potential future dangers such as leaks, security lapses, and
improper arrests. For example, during the late 1960s and early 1970s, the
Philadelphia Police Department (PPD) compiled about 18,000 files on
various dissident individuals and groups. During a national television
broadcast, PPD officials disclosed the names of some of the people on
whom files were kept.140
Third, government entities are using personal information in databases
to conduct automated investigations. In 1977, in order to detect fraud, the
federal government began matching its computer employee records with
those of people receiving federal benefits.141 With the use of computers to
match records of different government entities, the government
investigated millions of people. Some matching programs used data
obtained from private sector sources (merchants and marketing companies)
to discover tax, welfare, and food stamp fraud as well as to identify drug
couriers.142 Computer matching raised significant concerns, and in 1988,
134. See id. at 143.
135. See id. at 146; Barringer, supra note 67, at WK3.
136. See DIFFIE & LANDAU, supra note 128, at 143.
137. Although the Army’s surveillance efforts were challenged before the Supreme Court on First
Amendment grounds in Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1, 1 (1972), the Court concluded that the targets of the
information gathering lacked standing because they only alleged “generalized yet speculative
apprehensiveness that the Army may at some future date misuse the information in some way that
would cause direct harm to [them].” Id. at 13.
138. Id.
139. See id. at 7.
140. See Philadelphia Yearly Meeting of the Religious Society of Friends v. Tate, 519 F.2d 1335,
1335 (3d Cir. 1975).
141. See PRISCILLA M. REGAN, LEGISLATING PRIVACY 86 (1995); Robert Gellman, Does Privacy
Law Work?, in TECHNOLOGY AND PRIVACY: THE NEW LANDSCAPE 193, 198 (Philip E. Agre & Marc
Rotenberg, eds., 1997).
142. See GARY T. MARX, UNDERCOVER: POLICE SURVEILLANCE IN AMERICA 209–10 (1988).
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Congress finally passed a law regulating this practice.143 The law has been
strongly criticized as providing scant substantive guidance and having little
practical effect.144 This type of automated investigation is troubling
because it alters the way that government investigations typically take
place. Usually, the government has some form of particularized suspicion,
a factual basis to believe that a particular person may be engaged in illegal
conduct. Particularized suspicion keeps the government’s profound
investigative powers in check preventing widespread surveillance and
snooping into the lives and affairs of all citizens. Computer matches,
Priscilla Regan contends, investigate everyone, and most people who are
investigated are innocent.145
With the new information supplied by the private sector, there is an
increased potential for more automated investigations, such as searches for
all people who purchase books about particular topics or those who visit
certain websites, or perhaps even people whose personal interests fit a
profile for those likely to engage in certain forms of criminal activity.
Automated investigations based on profiles share the problems experienced
with profiling: the inappropriate use of stereotypes, race, and religion.
Profiling or automated investigations based on information gathered
through digital dossiers results in targets being inappropriately singled out
for more airport searches, police investigations, or even arrest or detention.
Fourth, the government can use dossiers of personal information in
mass roundups of distrusted or suspicious individuals whenever the
political climate is ripe. As Pamela Samuelson observed: “One factor that
enabled the Nazis to efficiently round up, transport, and seize assets of
Jews (and others they viewed as ‘undesirables’) was the extensive
repositories of personal data available not only from the public sector but
143. See Computer Matching and Privacy Protection Act (CMPPA) of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-503,
102 Stat. 2507, codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. §§ 552a(a)(8)–(13), e(12), (o)–(r), (u). The CMPPA
requires agencies to formulate procedural agreements before exchanging computerized record systems
and establishes Data Integrity Boards within each agency. See id. The CMPPA establishes Data
Integrity Boards within each agency to oversee matching, requires agencies to perform a cost-benefit
analysis of proposed matching endeavors, and requires agencies to notify individuals of the termination
of benefits due to computer matching and to permit individuals an opportunity to refute the termination.
See id.
144. See GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, COMPUTER MATCHING: QUALITY OF DECISIONS AND
SUPPORTING ANALYSES LITTLE AFFECTED BY 1988 ACT (1993); SCHWARTZ & REIDENBERG, supra
note 5, at 101; INFORMATION POLICY COMMITTEE, NATIONAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE TASK
FORCE, OPTIONS FOR PROMOTING PRIVACY ON THE NATIONAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE:
DRAFT FOR PUBLIC COMMENT 15 (Apr. 1997); Schwartz, Privacy and Participation, supra note 5, at
588 (noting that CMPPA “creates no substantive guidelines to determine when matching is
acceptable”).
145. See REGAN, supra note 141, at 90.

SOLO10.DOC

1110

9/3/02 8:49 AM

SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 75:1083

also from private sector sources.”146 In the United States, information
gathering greatly assisted the roundups of disfavored groups, including
Japanese-Americans during World War II. Following the bombing of Pearl
Harbor on December 7, 1941, the FBI detained thousands of JapaneseAmerican community leaders in internment camps.147 These initial
roundups were facilitated by an index of potentially subversive people of
Japanese descent compiled by the Justice Department beginning in the late
1930s.148 In 1942, in the name of national security, about 120,000 people
of Japanese descent living on the West Coast were imprisoned in
internment camps.149 The Census Bureau prepared special tabulations of
Japanese-Americans, which, according to a 1942 War Department report,
“became the basis for the general evacuation and relocation plan.”150
The gathering of personal data also facilitated the Palmer Raids of
1919–20 (also known as the “Red Scare”). In 1991, a rash of bombings
sparked the Palmer Raids, one of which damaged the home of Attorney
General A. Mitchell Palmer.151 Bombs went off in eight other cities shortly
thereafter and letter bombs were mailed to many elites.152 In a climate rife
with fear of “Reds,” anarchists, and labor unrest,153 Congress tasked the
Bureau of Investigation (again, the organization that later became the FBI
in 1935) with addressing these terrorist threats.154 Under the direction of a
young J. Edgar Hoover, the Bureau of Investigation developed an extensive
index of hundreds of thousands of radicals.155 This data was used to
conduct a massive series of raids, in which over 10,000 individuals
suspected of being Communists were rounded up, many without

146. Pamela Samuelson, Privacy as Intellectual Property?, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1125, 1143 (2000).
See also DAVID H. FLAHERTY, PROTECTING PRIVACY IN SURVEILLANCE SOCIETIES 373–74 (1989).
147. ERIC. K. YAMAMOTO, MARGARET CHON, CAROL I. IZUMI, JERRY KANG, & FRANK H. WU,
RACE, RIGHTS, AND REPARATIONS: LAW AND THE JAPANESE AMERICAN INTERNMENT 38 (2001).
148. See id. at 96.
149. See id. at 38–39. See also Daniel J. Solove, The Darkest Domain: Deference, Judicial
Review, and the Bill of Rights, 84 IOWA L. REV. 941, 941 (1999). See generally Eugene V. Rostow,
The Japanese American Cases—A Disaster, 54 YALE L.J. 489 (1945).
150. DIFFIE & LANDAU, supra note 128, at 138. See also DAVID BURNHAM, THE RISE OF THE
COMPUTER STATE 24 (1983).
151. FRANK J. DONNER, THE AGE OF SURVEILLANCE: THE AIMS AND METHODS OF AMERICA’S
POLITICAL INTELLIGENCE SYSTEM 33 (1980).
152. See GENTRY, supra note 118, at 76. Most of the letter bombs were halted at the Post Office
due to inadequate postage. See id.
153. See CHARLES H. MCCORMICK, SEEING REDS: FEDERAL SURVEILLANCE OF RADICALS IN THE
PITTSBURGH MILL DISTRICT, 1917–1921, 120 (1997); POWERS, supra note 118, at 69.
154. See MCCORMICK, supra note 153, at 103.
155. See DONNER, supra note 151, at 34; GENTRY, supra note 118, at 79; POWERS, supra note
118, at 68.
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warrants.156 The raids resulted in a number of deportations, many based
solely on membership in certain organizations.157 When prominent figures
in the legal community such as Roscoe Pound, Felix Frankfurter, and
Zechariah Chafee, Jr., criticized the raids, Hoover began assembling a
dossier on each of them.158
Additionally, personal information gathered by the FBI enabled the
extensive hunt for Communists during the late 1940s and 1950s—a period
of history that has since been criticized as a severe over-reaction, resulting
in the mistreatment of numerous individuals, and impeding the reform
agenda begun in the New Deal.159 According to Ellen Schrecker, federal
agencies’ “bureaucratic interests, including the desire to present themselves
as protecting the community against the threat of internal subversion,
inspired them to exaggerate the danger of radicalism.”160 Senator Joseph
R. McCarthy, the figure who symbolized the anti-Communist movement,
received substantial assistance from Hoover, who secretly released
information about suspected Communists to McCarthy.161 Further, the FBI
supplied a steady stream of names of individuals to be called before the
House Un-American Activities Committee (HUAC).162 As Richard
Powers observed, “information derived from the [FBI’s] files was clearly
the lifeblood of the Washington anti-communist establishment.”163 The
FBI also leaked information about suspected individuals to employers and
the press.164 Public accusations of being a Communist carried an immense
stigma and often resulted in a severe public backlash.165 Individuals
exposed as Communists faced retaliation in the private sector. Numerous
journalists, professors and entertainers were fired from their jobs and
blacklisted from future employment.166

156. See GENTRY, supra note 118, at 93.
157. See POWERS, supra note 118, at 79–80.
158. See GENTRY, supra note 118, at 98–99.
159. See ELLEN SCHRECKER, THE AGE OF MCCARTHYISM: A BRIEF HISTORY WITH DOCUMENTS
92–94 (1994).
160. Id. at 10.
161. GENTRY, supra note 118, at 378–80, 402; POWERS, supra note 118, at 320–21.
162. See SCHRECKER, supra note 159, at 76–84. For further background about the McCarthy era,
see generally ALBERT FRIED, MCCARTHYISM: THE GREAT AMERICAN RED SCARE: A DOCUMENTARY
HISTORY (1997) and RICHARD M. FRIED, NIGHTMARE IN RED: THE MCCARTHY ERA IN PERSPECTIVE
(1990).
163. POWERS, supra note 118, at 321.
164. See SCHRECKER, supra note 159, at 77.
165. See Seth I. Kreimer, Sunlight, Secrets, and Scarlet Letters: The Tension Between Privacy and
Disclosure in Constitutional Law, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 13–71 (1991).
166. SCHRECKER, supra note 159, at 76–84.
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In short, government entities have demonstrated substantial abilities to
gather and store personal information. Combined with the extensive data
available about individuals in third party records, this creates a recipe for
similar or greater government abuses in the future.
Fifth, unscrupulous government and law enforcement officials can
abuse the availability of personal information databases. Recently, a
Michigan State Police official allegedly accessed the Law Enforcement
Information Network (LEIN), a law enforcement database of personal
information, to examine her ex-husband’s girlfriend’s background.167 The
official was punished with a mere day’s suspension without pay.168 Prior
to this incident, allegedly over ninety law enforcement officials had abused
the LEIN during the past five years.169
Sixth, information obtained by the government for one purpose can
readily be used for another. For example, the government may be
investigating whether a prominent critic of the war against terrorism has in
any way assisted terrorists or is engaged in terrorism. In tracking an
individual’s activities, the government does not discover any criminal
activity with regard to terrorism, but discovers that a popular website for
downloading music files has been visited and that copyright laws have been
violated.170 Such information may ultimately be used to prosecute
copyright violations as a pretext for the government’s distaste for the
individual’s political views and beliefs. Further, dossiers maintained by
law enforcement organizations can be selectively leaked to attack critics.171
Indeed, it is not far-fetched for government officials to amass data for
use in silencing or attacking enemies, critics, undesirables, or radicals. For
example, J. Edgar Hoover accumulated an extensive collection of files with
detailed information about the private lives of numerous prominent
individuals, including presidents, members of Congress, Supreme Court

167. See M.L. Elrick, Cops Abuse Database, 3 Privacy Suits Say They Charge Officers Use LEIN
to Check Out Personal Matters, DETROIT FREE PRESS, Dec. 25, 2001, at A1.
168. See id.
169. See id.
170. For an excellent discussion of Napster and the impact of copyright law on music sharing, see
generally Raymond Shih-Ray Ku, The Creative Destruction of Copyright: Napster and the New
Economics of Digital Technology, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 263 (2002).
171. See JOSEPH BENSMAN & ROBERT LILIENFELD, BETWEEN PUBLIC AND PRIVATE: THE LOST
BOUNDARIES OF THE SELF 97 (1979) (“Large-scale organizations tend to invade privacy . . .in order to
use the information so gained as a private means to secure its public goals and in part by using managed
leaks to reveal the private vices of their organizational and personal enemies.”).
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justices, celebrities, civil rights leaders, and attorney generals.172 Hoover’s
data often included sexual activities.173
We live in a world of mixed and changing motives. Data that is
obtained for one purpose can be used for an entirely different purpose as
motives change. For example, for several years, the FBI extensively
wiretapped Martin Luther King, Jr.174 They wiretapped his home, his
office, and the hotel rooms that he stayed at when traveling.175 Based on
the wiretaps, the FBI learned of his extensive partying, extramarital affairs,
and other sexual activities.176 A high level FBI official even anonymously
sent him a tape with highlights of the FBI’s recordings along with a letter
that stated:
King, there is only one thing left for you to do. You know what it is.
You have just 34 days in which to do (this exact number has been
selected for a specific reason, it has definite practical significant [sic]).
You are done. There is but one way out for you. You better take it
before your filthy, abnormal fraudulent self is bared to the nation.177

Hoover’s motive is disputed. One theory is that King was wiretapped
because he was friendly with a person who had previously been a member
of the Communist Party.178 Another theory is that Hoover despised King.
Hoover’s longstanding hatred of King is evidenced by Hoover’s nasty
public statements about King, such as calling King “the most notorious
liar” in the nation.179 This was probably due, in part, to King’s criticism of
the FBI for failing to address adequately the violence against blacks in the
South, Hoover’s overreaction to any criticism of the FBI, and the FBI’s
practice of consistently targeting its critics.180
As David Garrow
hypothesizes, the original reason that the FBI began gathering information
about King was due to fears of Communist ties; however, this motivation

172. CHARLES J. SYKES, THE END OF PRIVACY: PERSONAL RIGHTS IN THE SURVEILLANCE
SOCIETY 160 (1999). See DIFFIE & LANDAU, supra note 128, at 163 (wiretapping of members of
Congress and Supreme Court Justices); GENTRY, supra note 118 (providing detailed description of
Hoover’s collection of files and extensive wiretapping).
173. See GARROW, supra note 117, at 165.
174. See, e.g., DIFFIE & LANDAU, supra note 128, at 140–42. It was not until 1975, nearly a
decade after the wiretapping and three years after Hoover’s death, that Congress conducted an inquiry
into the wiretapping of King through the famous Church Committee. See id. at 178.
175. GARROW, supra note 117, at 100–01.
176. See id. at 102 passim.
177. Id. at 126.
178. Id. at 26.
179. See id. at 78. Hoover’s dislike of King may have also stemmed from racism. It is welldocumented that Hoover was racist. See id. at 153.
180. See id. at 79–83.
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changed once these fears proved unfounded and several powerful
individuals at the FBI expressed distaste for King’s sexual activities and
moral behavior.181
D. PROTECTING PRIVACY WITH AN ARCHITECTURE OF POWER
The dangers discussed above illustrate why privacy is integral to
freedom in the modern state. Privacy must be protected by establishing an
architecture of power. The word “architecture” emphasizes that the
protection of privacy must be achieved through establishing a particular
social structure that distributes power in our various relationships.
Certain kinds of legal regulation can be readily analogized to
architecture. Typically, we view architecture as the design of buildings and
edifices. Buildings structure the way people feel and interact; they form
and shape human relationships.182 Neal Kumar Katyal provides a
fascinating account of how physical architecture—the way that
neighborhoods and buildings are designed—can affect criminal
behavior.183 Law resembles architecture in many respects, especially in the
way that certain forms of regulation affect social practices.
If we think of law as creating a structure, we can better understand the
different forms that modern regulation must take to protect liberty in the
modern state. We have freedom not simply because we have rights. Our
liberty is constructed by various regulatory structures that regulate the
safety of the products we buy, the conditions of the apartments we live in,
the way that companies must interact with us, and the sanctity of the
environment, among others. An architecture of power protects a number of
social practices of which privacy forms a significant part. It protects

181. See id. at 151. According to Garrow, the investigation and electronic surveillance of King in
1962–63 began as an inquiry into King’s ties with Levison; in 1963–64, the investigation turned to an
effort to discredit and attack King.
182. See generally THOMAS A. MARKUS, BUILDINGS AND POWER: FREEDOM AND CONTROL IN
THE ORIGIN OF MODERN BUILDING TYPES (1993). One of the most famous examples of the way
architecture can affect social structure is the Panopticon, an architectural design for a prison developed
by Jeremy Bentham. According to this design, prison cells are arranged around a central observation
tower, from which all cells are visible. However, those in the cells cannot observe if anybody is in the
tower. The goal of this architecture is for each prisoner to believe that at any moment, she could be
being watched, and this belief will result in increased obedience. As Michel Foucault aptly noted, the
Panopticon can be replicated in our society in ways not merely limited to physical architecture.
Panoptic architecture can be part of the structure of social relationships. See MICHEL FOUCAULT,
DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH: THE BIRTH OF THE PRISON 200–05 (Alan Sheridan Trans. 1977).
183. Neal Kumar Katyal, Architecture as Crime Control, 111 Yale L.J. 1039 (2002).
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privacy by providing a regulatory structure that shapes relationships and
safeguards individual liberties.
At the center of my view is the fact that privacy is an aspect of social
practices, which involve relationships with other people and entities.184
The need for privacy emerges from within a society, from the various social
relationships that people form with each other, with private sector
institutions, and with the government. We do not need privacy on a
deserted island; rather, the need for privacy is engendered by the existence
of society, from the fact that we must live together.
Relationships involve some balance of power between the parties.
Power is not necessarily a zero-sum good, where more power to one party
necessarily means less to another. However, certain configurations of
power in these relationships have profound effects on the scope and extent
of freedom, democracy, equality, and other important values. In the
modern world, we are increasingly finding ourselves in a new type of
relationship with public and private institutions. These relationships are
different because our institutions are more bureaucratic in nature.
Bureaucracies use more information and often exercise power over people
through the use of personal data. Collecting and using personal
information are having an intensifying influence on the effects of power in
our social relationships. Therefore, protecting privacy is critical to
governing these relationships, and consequently, to regulating the tone and
tenor of life in the Information Age.
Protecting privacy through an architecture of power differs from
protecting it as an individual right. Privacy is often viewed as an individual
right.185 It is seen as an individual possession, and its value is defined in
terms of its worth to the individual. This view is severely flawed. John
Dewey astutely critiqued the “conception of the individual as something
given, complete in itself, and of liberty as a ready-made possession of the

184. For an extensive discussion of how privacy relates to social practices, see Solove, supra note
17, at 1126–43.
185. See, e.g., Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 99 (1998) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“Fourth
Amendment protection . . . is in essence a personal right.”); Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 599–00
(1977) (privacy is an “individual interest in avoiding disclosure of personal matters”); Restatement
(Second of Torts § 652(I) comment (a) (stating that “[t]he right protected by the action for invasion of
privacy is a personal right, peculiar to the individual whose privacy is invaded”); ELLEN ALDERMAN &
CAROLINE KENNEDY, THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY xv (1995) (noting that “privacy is, by definition, a
personal right”); William M. Beaney, The Right to Privacy and American Law, 31 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 253, 254 (1966) (observing that “[t]he right to privacy is an affirmation of the importance of
certain aspects of the individual person and his desired freedom from unreasonable intrusive conduct by
others”).
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individual, only needing the removal of external restrictions in order to
manifest itself.”186 According to Dewey, the individual is inextricably
connected to society,187 and rights are not immutable possessions of
individuals, but are instrumental in light of “the contribution they make to
the welfare of the community.”188 The problem with viewing rights in
purely individualistic terms is that it pits individual rights against the
greater good of the community, with the interests of society often winning
out because of their paramount importance when measured against one
individual’s freedom.
Viewing privacy as an individual right against government
information-gathering conceives of the harm to privacy as emanating from
the invasion into the lives of particular people. But many of the people
asserting a right to privacy against government information-gathering are
criminals or terrorists, people we do not have a strong desire to protect. In
modern Fourth Amendment law, privacy protection is often initiated at the
behest of specific individuals, typically those accused of crimes. Often
these individuals’ rights conflict with the need for effective law
enforcement and the protection of society. Why should one individual’s
preference for privacy trump the social goals of security and safety? This
question is difficult to answer if privacy is understood as a right possessed
by particular people.
In contrast, an architecture of power protects privacy differently and is
based on a different conception of privacy. Privacy is not merely a right
possessed by individuals, but is a form of freedom built into the social
structure. It is thus an issue about the common good as much as it is about
individual rights. It is an issue about social architecture, about the
relationships that form the structure of our society.
Government information-gathering is a central facet of our
relationships to the government. The increased stores of personal
information in the hands of law enforcement officials pose a number of
dangers, discussed in the previous section. The abuses of government
information-gathering chronicled earlier could be dismissed as those
generated by the megalomania of a few rogue officials. David Garrow has
another theory, one that is more frightening. According to Garrow, the FBI
186. John Dewey, The Future of Liberalism, in 11 LATER WORKS 290 (Jo Ann Boydston ed.
1991).
187. See, e.g., JOHN DEWEY, EXPERIENCE AND NATURE 162–63 (1925); DEWEY, LIBERALISM
AND SOCIAL ACTION 7 (1935).
188. John Dewey, Liberalism and Civil Liberties, in 11 LATER WORKS 374 (Jo Ann Boydston ed.
1991).
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that targeted Martin Luther King, Jr. was not a “deviant institution in
American society, but actually a most representative and faithful one.”189
In other words, the FBI reflected the mindset of many Americans
embodying all the flaws of that mindset. We like to blame individuals, and
certainly the particular abusers are worthy of blame, but we cannot
overlook the fact that the causes of abuse often run deeper than the corrupt
official. Abuse is made possible by a bureaucratic machinery that is readily
susceptible to manipulation. Thus, the problem lies in institutional
structures and architectures of power. In the latter half of the twentieth
century, and continuing to the present, one of the aspects of this
architecture has been the lack of control over government informationgathering.
What is the most effective architecture of power to structure the way
that the government can access personal information held by third parties?
In the pages that follow, I discuss the two relevant architectures, that of the
Fourth Amendment, which the Court has concluded does not apply to
information held by third parties, and that of the statutory regime that has
arisen in the void left by the inapplicability of the Fourth Amendment.
III. THE FOURTH AMENDMENT, RECORDS, AND PRIVACY
A. THE ARCHITECTURE OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
1. The Purposes and Structure of the Fourth Amendment
For better or for worse, we currently regulate law enforcement in the
United States with a constitutional regulatory regime, comprised primarily
by the Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Amendments. A significant part of this
regime applies to government information-gathering.
The Fifth
Amendment affords individuals a privilege against being compelled to
testify about incriminating information.190 The focus of this Part is the
Fourth Amendment, which regulates the ability of the government to obtain
information through searches and seizures. The Fourth Amendment
provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated,
and no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath

189.
190.

GARROW, supra note 117, at 209.
See U.S. CONST. amend. V.
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or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and
the persons or things to be seized.191

The Fourth Amendment contains two clauses, the first establishing the
right to be secure in persons, houses, papers, and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures and the second stating the requirements
for a valid warrant. A long running debate in Fourth Amendment discourse
concerns the relationship between the clauses.192
Substantively, the Fourth Amendment’s focus has been on protecting
privacy against certain government activities. Procedurally, permissible
exercises of government power are controlled through the process of
obtaining a warrant supported by probable cause.
The first and most important issue in Fourth Amendment analysis is
whether the Fourth Amendment applies to the particular government
action. Although the Fourth Amendment applies to government activity in
both the civil and criminal contexts,193 it is limited to activities that
constitute “searches” and “seizures.” Certain activities, such as seeing
things in public, are not searches.194 Further, the Court has held that the
Fourth Amendment only governs searches where an individual has a
reasonable expectation of privacy.195
Once the Fourth Amendment applies, a search or seizure must be
“reasonable.”196 Although technically the two clauses of the Fourth
Amendment are separate, the Court has interpreted the requirement that a
search or seizure be reasonable as closely related to the requirement of a
warrant. Generally, searches and seizures without a warrant are per se
unreasonable.197 This has become known as the “per se” warrant rule.198
Even if the requirements for a valid warrant are established, the Fourth
Amendment prohibits the search if it is unreasonable.199 However, the
191. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
192. See generally AKHIL REED AMAR, THE CONSTITUTION AND CRIMINAL PROCEDURE (1997);
Silas J. Wasserstrom, The Fourth Amendment’s Two Clauses, 26 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1389 (1989).
193. AMAR, supra note 192, at 9.
194. See, e.g., Harris v. United States, 390 U.S. 234, 236 (1968) (“It has long been settled that
objects falling in the plain view of an officer who has a right to be in the position to have that view are
subject to seizure and may be introduced in evidence.”).
195. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 347 (1967). For a discussion of the reasonable
expectation of privacy test, see infra Part III.A.2.
196. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
197. See AMAR, supra note 192, at 3–4.
198. See id.; Sherry F. Colb, The Qualitative Dimension of Fourth Amendment “Reasonableness,”
98 COLUM. L. REV. 1642, 1648 (1998); Wasserstrom & Seidman, supra note 110, at 26–27.
199. See AMAR, supra note 192, at 16.
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Court has rarely found that a search conducted pursuant to a warrant
supported by probable cause was unreasonable.200 Unfortunately, as
commentators have pointed out, when the Court has approached what is
“reasonable,” it has failed to give “reasonable” any teeth.201 Therefore, if
the government obtains a valid search warrant, in most cases the search or
seizure is reasonable so long as it is properly within the scope of the
warrant.
To obtain a warrant, the police must demonstrate to a neutral judge or
magistrate that they have “probable cause”—”where ‘the facts and
circumstances within [the police’s] knowledge and of which they had
reasonably trustworthy information [are] sufficient in themselves to
warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that an offense has been
or is being committed.”202
Despite the Court’s pronouncement in Katz in 1967 that there are only
“a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions” to the
warrant requirement,203 in the decades following Katz, the Court has made
numerous exceptions.204 For example, the Court held in Terry v. Ohio205
that the police could stop and frisk an individual without a warrant or
probable cause. Further, the Court has held that “special needs” in the
contexts of schools and workplaces make the warrant and probable cause
requirements impracticable.206 In the words of Silas Wasserstrom and
200. The most famous example is Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753 (1985), where the Court held that
a surgical incision to remove a bullet from the suspect’s body to provide evidence was unreasonable,
warrant notwithstanding. However, the Court has sustained a number of other bodily intrusions to
obtain evidence, such as the withdrawal of blood to test for blood alcohol level. See Schmerber v.
California, 384 U.S. 757, 757 (1966).
201. See, e.g., Colb, supra note 198, at 1645, 1687–88 (1998) (pointing out the lack of teeth in the
Court’s current Fourth Amendment reasonableness balancing and proposing that the Court “recognize
that an ‘unreasonable’ search in violation of the Fourth Amendment occurs whenever the intrusiveness
of a search outweighs the gravity of the offense being investigated”); Tracey Maclin, Constructing
Fourth Amendment Principles from the Government Perspective: Whose Amendment Is It, Anyway?, 25
AM. CRIM. L. REV. 669, 719 (1988).
202. Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175–76 (1949).
203. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967).
204. See AMAR, supra note 192, at 3–4; Christopher Slobogin, The World Without a Fourth
Amendment, 39 UCLA L. REV. 1, 18 (1991).
205. 392 U.S. 1, 1 (1968). See also Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967) (holding
that although health, fire, and safety inspectors could not enter a home without a warrant, they need not
demonstrate probable cause to obtain the warrant). For a critique of Terry and Camara, see Scott E.
Sundby, A Return to Fourth Amendment Basics: Undoing the Mischief of Camara and Terry, 72 MINN.
L. REV. 383 (1988).
206. See, e.g., Vernonia Sch. Dist. v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646 (1995) (drug testing by school
officials); Nat’l Treasury Employees Union v. Von Rabb, 489 U.S. 656 (1989) (drug testing of Customs
officials); Skinner v. Ry Labor Executives Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602 (1989) (drug testing of railroad
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Louis Michael Seidman, the per se warrant rule “is so riddled with
exceptions, complexities, and contradictions that it has become a trap for
the unwary.”207
Currently, the Amendment is enforced primarily through the
exclusionary rule208 and, to a lesser degree, through civil liability in § 1983
actions.209 In 1961, in Mapp v. Ohio,210 the Court held that in all criminal
proceedings, both federal and state, evidence obtained in violation of the
Fourth Amendment must be excluded from the defendant’s criminal
trial.211 According to Arnold Loewy: “The exclusionary rule protects
innocent people by eliminating the incentive to search and seize
unreasonably.”212 Without the exclusionary rule, Justice Holmes observed,
the Fourth Amendment would be a mere “form of words.”213 The
exclusionary rule, however, has long been a sore spot in Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence, engendering an extensive debate over its
desirability and efficacy.214
employees); O’Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709 (1987) (search by government employer); New Jersey
v. TLO, 469 U.S. 325 (1985) (search by school officials).
207. Wasserstrom & Seidman, supra note 119, at 34.
208. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 657 (1961) (holding that the exclusionary rule applies to all
government searches, state and federal).
209. Liability under § 1983 has been severely limited due to qualified immunity for police
officers, see generally Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982), as well as the lack of direct liability
for states. See generally Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890). Municipalities and local governments
can be sued, but they are only liable “when execution of a government’s policy or custom, whether
made by its lawmakers or by those whose edicts or acts may fairly represent official policy inflicts the
injury.” Monell v. New York City Dep’t of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 658 (1978).
210. 367 U.S. 643, 643 (1961).
211. Prior to Mapp, the Court held that the exclusionary rule only applied to evidence improperly
obtained by federal officials in federal court. See Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 398 (1914). In
Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949), the Court held that the exclusionary rule does not apply to state
officials. In Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206 (1960), the Court began to reverse course, holding
that evidence seized by state police in violation of Fourth Amendment is excluded in federal court. For
more background about the development of the exclusionary rule, see Potter Stewart, The Road to
Mapp v. Ohio and Beyond: The Origins, Development and Future of the Exclusionary Rule in Search
and Seizure Cases, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 1365 (1983).
212. Arnold H. Loewy, The Fourth Amendment as a Device for Protecting the Innocent, 81 MICH.
L. REV. 1229, 1266 (1983).
213. Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385, 392 (1920).
214. Several commentators have criticized the exclusionary rule, advocating a system of civil
damages rather than the exclusion of inculpatory evidence. See AMAR, supra note 192, at 28 ([the
criminal defendant is] an awkward champion of the Fourth Amendment. . . . He is often
unrepresentative of the larger class of law-abiding citizens, and his interests regularly conflict with
theirs.”); Id. at 20–21 (suggesting tort remedies); Christopher Slobogin, Why Liberals Should Chuck the
Exclusionary Rule, 1999 U. ILL. L. REV. 363, 400–01 (1999) (arguing for a damages remedy because
the exclusionary rule fails to provide an adequate remedy to innocent people whose Fourth Amendment
rights are violated and because the rule results in judicial reluctance to expand Fourth Amendment
protection). Other commentators argue that civil damages will prove to be much less successful than

SOLO10.DOC

2002]

9/3/02 8:49 AM

DISSIPATION OF FOURTH AMENDMENT PRIVACY

1121

2. Fourth Amendment Scope: Privacy
As applied by the Court, the Fourth Amendment has focused on
protecting against invasions of privacy,215 although some commentators
contend this focus is misguided. According to William Stuntz, criminal
procedure is “firmly anchored in a privacy value that had already proved
inconsistent with the modern state.”216 For Stuntz, privacy vis-à-vis the
government is impracticable given the rise of the administrative state, with
its extensive health and welfare regulation. Stuntz asserts that robust
Fourth Amendment protection of privacy will prevent the government from
regulating industry, uncovering white-collar crime, and inspecting industry
facilities. The government must collect information to enforce certain
regulations, such as securities laws, and worker safety protections.217 “By
focusing on privacy,” Stuntz argues, “Fourth Amendment law has largely
abandoned the due process cases concern with coercion and violence.”218
“The problem,” argues Stuntz, “is not information gathering but [police]
violence.”219
Scott Sundby offers a different critique of the Fourth Amendment’s
focus on privacy. Privacy, although “meant to liberate the [Fourth]
Amendment from wooden categorizations . . . [, has] turned out to contain
the seeds for the later contraction of Fourth Amendment rights.”220 “The
Fourth Amendment as a privacy-focused doctrine has not fared well with
the changing times of an increasingly nonprivate world and a judicial
reluctance to expand individual rights.”221 The Fourth Amendment should
be redefined as promoting “‘trust’ between the government and the
citizenry.”222 In contrast to totalitarian states, where the government

the exclusionary rule. See Loewy, supra note 212, at 1266 (arguing that under a damages regime, if the
government really wants to search, it will conduct the illegal search and pay the damages); Maclin,
supra note, 130 at 62 (contending that juries sympathize with the police in civil suits to enforce the
Fourth Amendment and that damages are hard to prove).
215. See William J. Stuntz, Privacy’s Problem and the Law of Criminal Procedure, 93 MICH. L.
REV. 1016, 1019 (1995).
216. Stuntz, supra note 119, at 442.
217. See Stuntz, supra note 215, at 1019.
218. Stuntz, supra note 119, at 446. See also Stuntz, supra note 215, at 1044 (“Coercion becomes
the law’s focus only in . . . the most extreme cases. Elsewhere, the law’s chief concern remains
privacy”).
219. Stuntz, supra note 215, at 1077.
220. Scott E. Sundby, “Everyman”’s Fourth Amendment: Privacy or Mutual Trust Between
Government and Citizen?, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1751, 1757–58 (1994).
221. Id. at 1771.
222. Id. at 1777.
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demonstrates a profound distrust of the people, the government should
“trust that the citizenry will exercise its liberties responsibly.”223
However, Sundby assumes that “privacy” means what the Court says
it means. Many current problems in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence
stem from the Court’s failure to conceptualize privacy adequately, both in
method and substance. Methodologically, the Court has attempted to
adhere to a unified conception of privacy. Conceptualizing privacy by
attempting to isolate its essence or common denominator has inhibited the
Court from conceptualizing privacy in a way that can adapt to changing
technology and social practices.224 Consider that, substantively, the Court
originally conceptualized privacy in physical terms as protecting tangible
property or preventing trespasses225 and that after Katz, the Court shifted to
viewing privacy as a form of total secrecy.226 In each of these conceptual
paradigms, the Court has rigidly adhered to a single narrow conception and
has lost sight of the Fourth Amendment’s larger purposes.
In contrast, the Fourth Amendment provides for an architecture of
power, a structure of protection that safeguards a range of different social
practices of which privacy forms an integral dimension. Those like Stuntz
and Sundby who contend that the Fourth Amendment should not concern
itself with privacy fail to see the importance of privacy in the relationship
between the government and the people. The private life is a critical point
for the exercise of power. Privacy involves aspects of our lives and social
practices where people feel vulnerable, uneasy, and fragile. It involves
aspects where the norms of social judgment are particularly abrasive and
oppressive. It is also implicated where information relates to issues of our
most basic needs and desires: finances, employment, entertainment,
political activity, sexuality, and family. The private life is an area of
profound sensitivity. Control over the private life is one of the central
techniques of government power in totalitarian states. Indeed, the great
distopian novels of the twentieth century—George Orwell’s Nineteen
Eighty-Four, Aldous Huxley’s Brave New World, and Franz Kafka’s The
Trial, illustrate how government exercises of power over the private life
stifle freedom and well-being.227

223. Id.
224. See Solove, supra note 17, at 1146–47.
225. See infra Part III.A.2.
226. See infra Part III.A.2.
227. See ALDOUS HUXLEY, BRAVE NEW WORLD (1932); FRANZ KAFKA, THE TRIAL (Willa &
Edwin Muir, et. al., trans., Alfred A. Knopf, Inc. 1956) (1937); ORWELL, supra note 96.
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Although Stuntz contends that the Fourth Amendment must turn away
from privacy after the rise of the administrative state, this is the very reason
why it is so important to protect privacy. The rise of the administrative
state threatens to give the government excessive power that could destroy
the Framer’s careful design to ensure that the power of the People remains
the strongest.228
In particular, the extensive power of modern
bureaucracies over individuals depends in significant part on the collection
and use of personal information. While Stuntz is correct that the Fourth
Amendment should not be cabined exclusively to protecting privacy and
should address other values, such as coercion and violence, he errs in
treating privacy and police coercion as mutually exclusive.229
Further, robust Fourth Amendment protection
need not be
inconsistent with the administrative state, as a significant portion of modern
administrative regulation concerns business and commercial activities
which lack Fourth Amendment rights equivalent to those guaranteed to
individuals.230 Stuntz retorts that for individuals to have a meaningful
protection of privacy, they must have privacy within institutions, and
giving privacy rights to individuals within institutions “is almost the same
as giving the institution itself a protectible privacy interest.”231 Further,
Stuntz contends, “a great deal of government information gathering targets
individuals,” such as the information that is gathered in tax forms.232
However, one need not adopt an all-or-nothing approach to Fourth
Amendment privacy. The Fourth Amendment does not categorically
prohibit the government from compelling certain disclosures by individuals
or institutions. If it did, then a significant amount of corporate regulation
and the tax system would be nearly impossible to carry out. But the fact
that the government can compel certain disclosures does not mean that it
228. Raymond Shih-Ray Ku, The Founders’ Privacy: The Fourth Amendment and the Power of
Technological Surveillance, 86 MINN. L. REV. 1325, 1340 (2002) (examining connection between the
Fourth Amendment to separation of powers).
229. See Daniel Yeager, Does Privacy Really Have a Problem in the Law of Criminal
Procedure?, 49 RUTGERS L. REV. 1283, 1309–10 (1997) (agreeing with Stuntz that regulatory
inspections can be more invasive of privacy than regular searches, but disagrees that “encounterless
police investigations should be more loosely controlled so they are better aligned with regulatory
inspections”). Louis Michael Seidman disputes Stuntz’s view that the Fourth Amendment places
privacy above coercion. See generally Louis Michael Seidman, The Problems with Privacy’s Problem,
93 MICH. L. REV. 1079 (1995).
230. Although corporations are deemed “persons” under the Fourteenth Amendment, see Santa
Clara County v. S. Pac. R.R., 118 U.S. 394, 394–95 (1886), they are not afforded Fourth Amendment
rights. See California Bankers Ass’n v. Shultz, 416 U.S. 21, 65 (1974) (stating that “corporations can
claim no equality with individuals in the enjoyment of a right to privacy”).
231. Stuntz, supra note 215, at 1037.
232. Id.
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can compel people to disclose the details of their sexual lives or require
them to send in their diaries and personal papers along with their tax forms.
Further, the fact that the government can inspect factories for safety
violations and food processing facilities for health violations does not mean
that the government should be able to search every employee’s office,
locker, or bag. Therefore, although misconceptualizing privacy, the Court
has correctly made it a focal point of the Fourth Amendment.
3. Fourth Amendment Structure: Warrants
Before eroding it with dozens of exceptions, the Court made the
Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement one of the central mechanisms
to ensure that the government was exercising its powers of information
gathering responsibly. Some critics, however, view warrants as relatively
unimportant in the Fourth Amendment scheme, as something to be
restricted rather than expanded. According to Akhil Amar, the Fourth
Amendment “does not require, presuppose, or even prefer warrants—it
limits them. Unless warrants meet certain strict standards, they are per se
unreasonable.”233 Amar contends that the colonial revolutionaries viewed
warrants with disdain because judges were highly influenced by the Crown
and warrants immunized government officials from civil liability after
conducting a search.234 Therefore, according to Amar, “[t]he core of the
Fourth Amendment, as we have seen, is neither a warrant nor probable
cause, but reasonableness.”235
Amar is too dismissive of warrants. Merely looking to colonial
precedents is insufficient, because the Fourth Amendment did not follow
colonial precedents (since general searches were rampant) but
“repudiate[d] them.”236 My aim, however, is not to quarrel about original
intent, as it remains unclear whether the per se warrant rule follows the
Framers’ intent. Even if Amar is right about the Framers’ intent, warrants
are an important device in our times since, as Scott Sundby observes, “the
Founders could not have foreseen the technological and regulatory reach of
government intrusions that exists today.”237
The warrant requirement embodies two important insights of the
Framers that particularly hold true today. First, the warrant requirement

233.
234.
235.
236.
237.

AMAR, supra note 192, at 11.
See id.
Id. at 31.
LEVY, supra note 130, at 154.
Sundby, supra note 220, at 1804.
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aims to prevent searches from turning into “fishing expeditions.”238
Accordingly, the warrant clause circumscribes searches and seizures. A
warrant must describe with “particular[ity] . . . the place to be searched and
the persons or things to be seized.”239
The Framers included the warrant clause because of their experience
with general warrants and writs of assistance.240 The colonists despised
writs of assistance because they authorized “sweeping searches and
seizures without any evidentiary basis.”241 The Fourth Amendment was
inspired by the use of general warrants by Britain, which “resulted in
‘ransacking’ and seizure of the personal papers of political dissenters,
authors, and printers of seditious libel.”242 As Patrick Henry declared:
“They may, unless the general government be restrained by a bill of rights,
or some similar restrictions, go into your cellars and rooms, and search,
ransack, and measure, everything you eat, drink, and wear. They ought to
be restrained within proper bounds.”243
Second, warrants reflect James Madison’s vision of the appropriate
architecture of power for a society in which the power of the people
remains paramount. Writing about separation of powers in Federalist No.
51, Madison observed:
But what is government itself but the greatest of all reflections on human
nature? If men were angels, no government would be necessary. If
angels were to govern men, neither external nor internal controuls on
government would be necessary. In framing a government which is to
be administered by men over men, the great difficulty lies in this: You
must first enable the government to controul the governed; and in the
next place, oblige it to controul itself. A dependence on the people is no
doubt the primary controul on the government; but experience has taught
mankind the necessity of auxiliary precautions.244

238. Louis Fisher, Congress and the Fourth Amendment, 21 GA. L. REV. 107, 115 (1986) (“The
spirit and letter of the fourth amendment counseled against the belief that Congress intended to
authorize a ‘fishing expedition’ into private papers on the possibility that they might disclose a crime.”).
239. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
240. Maclin, supra note 130, at 8. Indeed, as Maclin notes: “Everyone, including Amar, agrees
that the Framers opposed general warrants.” Id. at 9. See also LEVY, supra note 130, at 158.
241. Wasserstrom & Seidman, supra note 119, at 82.
242. DAVID M. O’BRIEN, PRIVACY, LAW, AND PUBLIC POLICY 38 (Prager Publishers 1979). See
also LEVY, supra note 130, at 150; Stuntz, supra note 119, at 406.
243. 3 THE DEBATES IN SEVERAL CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL
CONSTITUTION 448–49 (Jonathan Elliot ed., 1974).
244. James Madison, The Federalist, No. 51, in THE FEDERALIST 347, 349 (Jacob E. Cooke ed.,
1961).
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The profound insight of Madison and the Framers was that by
separating government powers between different entities and pitting them
against each other, government could be controlled. Madison was acutely
aware that the “parchment barriers” of the Constitution would fail to check
government encroachments of power, and he explained how both the
legislative and executive branches could overstep their bounds.245 He
therefore reasoned that government power should be constrained through
governmental architecture, not mere restrictive words.246 As Madison put
it, power should be diffused among different departments of government,
each of which should be given “the necessary constitutional means, and
personal motives, to resist encroachments of the others,”247 because
government will be kept in check only if its parts consist of “opposite and
rival interests.”248 Gordon Wood aptly described the Madisonian vision:
It was an imposing conception—a kinetic theory of politics—such a
crumbling of political and social interests, such an atomization of
authority, such a parceling of power, not only in the governmental
institutions but in the extended sphere of the society itself, creating such
a multiplicity and a scattering of designs and passions, so many checks,
that no combination of parts could hold, no group of evil interests could
long cohere. Yet out of the clashing and checking of this diversity,
Madison believed the public good, the true perfection of the whole,
would somehow arise.249

The warrant requirement reflects Madison’s philosophy of
government power by inserting the judicial branch in the middle of the
executive branch’s investigation process.250 Although warrants have been
criticized as ineffective because judges and magistrates often defer to the
police and prosecutor’s determination, Christopher Slobogin aptly contends
that warrants raise the “standard of care” of law enforcement officials by
forcing them to “document their requests for authorization.”251 According
to Stuntz, warrants make searching more expensive, because they require
law enforcement officials to “draft affidavits and wait around

245. James Madison, The Federalist, No. 48, supra note 244, at 333 (James Madison).
246. Madison, supra note 244, at 347 (James Madison).
247. Id. at 349.
248. Id.
249. GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 1776–1787 605 (Univ. of
North Carolina Press 1969).
250. Madison drafted the language of the Fourth Amendment. See Fisher, supra note 238, at 111–
12. As Levy observes, “Madison chose the maximum protection conceivable at the time.” LEVY, supra
note 130, at 176.
251. Slobogin, supra note 204, at 17.
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courthouses.”252 Because officers must devote time to obtaining a warrant,
they are unlikely to use them unless they think it is likely that they will find
what they are looking for.253 As Justice Douglas has explained for the
Court:
We are not dealing with formalities. The presence of a search warrant
serves a high function. Absent some grave emergency, the Fourth
Amendment has interposed a magistrate between the citizen and the
police. This was done neither to shield criminals nor to make the home a
safe haven for illegal activities. It was done so that an objective mind
might weigh the need to invade that privacy in order to enforce the law.
The right of privacy was deemed too precious to entrust to the discretion
of those whose job is the detection of crime and the arrest of criminals.
Power is a heady thing; and history shows that the police acting on their
own cannot be trusted. And so the Constitution requires a magistrate to
pass on the desires of the police before they violate the privacy of the
home.254

Further, the requirement of prior approval prevents government
officials from “dreaming up post hoc rationalizations”255 and from
experiencing judicial hindsight bias when evaluating the propriety of a
search after it has taken place.256 As Raymond Ku aptly observes, the
Framers adopted the Fourth Amendment based on concerns about limiting
executive power.257
My purpose is not to defend the existing structure of the Fourth
Amendment as perfect. For the purposes of this Article, it is sufficient to
agree (1) that the Fourth Amendment regime serves an important function
by establishing an architecture of power that aims to protect privacy in
addition to other values, and (2) that one of the central features of this
architecture requires neutral and external oversight of the executive
branch’s power to gather and use personal information.
252. William J. Stuntz, O.J. Simpson, Bill Clinton, and the Transsubstantive Fourth Amendment,
114 HARV. L. REV. 842, 848 (2001).
253. See id. at 848.
254. McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 455–56 (1948). See also Steagald v. United
States, 451 U.S. 204, 212 (1981) (warrants are necessary because law enforcement officials “may lack
sufficient objectivity”); Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 450 (1971) (stating that
“prosecutors and policemen simply cannot be asked to maintain the requisite neutrality with regard to
their own investigations”); Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13–14 (1948) (stating that the Fourth
Amendment ensures that inferences of potential culpability “be drawn by a neutral and detached
magistrate instead of being judged by the officer engaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting
out crime”).
255. AMAR, supra note 192, at 39.
256. See Steiker, supra note 121, at 853.
257. Ku, The Founders’ Privacy, supra note 228, at 1333–40.
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Even if its efficacy is limited, the structure of the Fourth Amendment
is better than a void. Few commentators have suggested that the Fourth
Amendment be repealed or that its larger purposes in controlling
government power are inimical to a well-functioning society. Outside the
realm of the Fourth Amendment is a great wilderness, a jungle of
government discretion and uncontrolled power. Thus, the issue of the
applicability of the Fourth Amendment is an important one, and to that
issue I now turn.
B. THE SHIFTING PARADIGMS OF FOURTH AMENDMENT PRIVACY
Some notion of privacy was always the trigger for Fourth Amendment
protection, at least since the late nineteenth century. In 1886, in Boyd v.
United States,258 an early case delineating the meaning of the Fourth and
Fifth Amendments,259 the government attempted to subpoena the records of
a merchant for use in a civil forfeiture proceeding.260 The Court held that
the subpoena violated the Fourth and Fifth Amendments:
It is not the breaking of his doors, and the rummaging of his drawers,
that constitutes the essence of the offence; but it is the invasion of his
indefeasible right of personal security, personal liberty and private
property, where that right has never been forfeited by his conviction of
some public offence . . . .261

Commentators have characterized Boyd as protecting property and as
consistent with the exaltation of property and contract during the Lochnerera.262 Although Boyd certainly furthers the ideology of the Lochner Court,
it should not merely be dismissed as the product of Lochner-like activism.
Boyd follows a conception of privacy that the Court consistently adhered to
in the late nineteenth century and the first half of the twentieth century.
Under this conception, the Court views invasions of privacy as a type of
physical injury involving incursions into tangible things.

258. 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
259. The Fifth Amendment provides that: “No person . . . shall be compelled in any criminal case
to be a witness against himself . . . .” U.S. CONST. amend. V. The Fifth Amendment’s “privilege
against self-incrimination” prevents the government from compelling individuals to disclose
inculpatory information about themselves. Id.
260. See Boyd, 116 U.S. at 617–18.
261. Id. at 630.
262. See, e.g., AMAR, supra note 192, at 22 (explaining that Boyd was part of the Lochner Court’s
staunch protection of property); O’BRIEN, supra note 242, at 22 (explaining that Boyd associated
privacy with “proprietary interests”); ALAN WESTIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM 339–41 (1967)
(describing the conception of privacy in Boyd as “propertied privacy”); Stuntz, supra note 215, at 1030–
34 (describing Boyd as part of Lochner Court’s impediment to the rise of the administrative state).
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The protection of tangible things extended beyond the home,
encompassing the opening of letters sent via the postal system. Nine years
prior to Boyd, the Court recognized in 1877, in Ex Parte Jackson,263 that
“[t]he constitutional guaranty of the right of the people to be secure in their
papers against unreasonable searches and seizures extends to their papers,
thus closed against inspection, wherever they may be.”264 Additionally,
privacy also concerned physical bodily intrusions. In Union Pacific
Railway Company v. Botsford,265 an 1891 case concerning privacy but not
directly involving the Fourth Amendment, the Court held that a court could
not compel a female plaintiff in a civil action to submit to a surgical
examination:
The inviolability of the person is as much invaded by a compulsory
stripping and exposure as by a blow. To compel any one, and especially
a woman, to lay bare the body, or to submit it to the touch of a stranger,
without lawful authority, is an indignity, an assault, and a
trespass . . . .266

Consistent with Boyd and Ex Parte Jackson, the Court readily
recognized the injury caused by physical intrusions such as trespassing into
homes, rummaging through one’s things, seizing one’s papers, opening and
examining one’s letters, or physically touching one’s body. Indeed, in
1890, when Warren and Brandeis authored their famous article The Right
to Privacy, they observed that the law, which had long recognized physical
and tangible injuries, was just beginning to recognize incorporeal ones.267
Warren and Brandeis argued that privacy was more than simply a physical
intrusion,268 a view increasingly recognized in the common law of torts in
the early twentieth century.269 However, in its Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence, the Court held fast to its physical intrusion conception of
privacy.
The Court’s view that Fourth Amendment privacy constituted
protection from physical intrusions came to a head in 1928 in Olmstead v.
United States.270 There, the Court held that the tapping of a person’s home

263. 96 U.S. 727 (1877).
264. Id. at 733.
265. 141 U.S. 250 (1891).
266. Id. at 252.
267. See Samuel Warren & Louis Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193, 193–95
(1890).
268. See id. at 195–97.
269. See Irwin R. Kramer, The Birth of Privacy Law: A Century Since Warren and Brandeis, 39
CATH. U. L. REV. 703, 704 (1990).
270. 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
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telephone outside a person’s house did not run afoul of the Fourth
Amendment because it did not involve a trespass inside a person’s home.
More specifically, it held that “[t]he Amendment does not forbid what was
done here. There was no searching. There was no seizure. The evidence
was secured by the use of the sense of hearing and that only. There was no
entry of the houses or offices of the defendants.”271 Olmstead relied upon
the Court’s physical intrusion conception of privacy. Since there was no
trespassing, opening, or rummaging, there was no invasion of Fourth
Amendment privacy.
Justice Louis Brandeis vigorously dissented, chastising the Court for
failing to adapt the Constitution to new problems. He observed: “When the
Fourth and Fifth Amendments were adopted, the form that evil had
theretofore taken had been necessarily simple.”272 Furthermore, “[the
government] could secure possession of [a person’s] papers and other
articles incident to his private life—a seizure effected, if need be, by
breaking and entry.”273 Brandeis argued that the Fourth Amendment was
designed to regulate this conduct—that
‘time works changes, brings into existence new conditions and
purposes.’ Subtler and more far-reaching means of invading privacy
have become available to the government. Discovery and invention have
made it possible for the government, by means far more effective than
stretching upon the rack, to obtain disclosure in court of what is
whispered in the closet.274

The Court, however, followed the Olmstead conception of privacy in
Goldman v. United States.275 The police placed a device called a
“detectaphone” on the wall next to a person’s office enabling them to
eavesdrop on the conversations inside the office.276 The Court concluded
that since there had been no physical trespass into the office, the Fourth
Amendment had not been violated.277
In 1967, nearly forty years after Olmstead, the Court in Katz v. United
States278 finally abandoned the physical intrusion conception of privacy,
and adopted the Fourth Amendment approach employed today. Katz
involved the wiretapping of a telephone conversation made by the
271.
272.
273.
274.
275.
276.
277.
278.

Id. at 464.
Id. at 473 (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (internal quotations omitted).
Id.
Id. at 473.
316 U.S. 129 (1942).
Id.
See id. at 134.
389 U.S. 347 (1967).
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defendant while in a phone booth. Explicitly overruling Olmstead and
Goldman, the Court declared: “What a person knowingly exposes to the
public, even in his own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth
Amendment protection. But what he seeks to preserve as private, even in
an area accessible to the public, may be constitutionally protected.”279
The Court’s approach to determining the applicability of the Fourth
Amendment emerged from Justice Harlan’s concurrence in Katz. The
“reasonable expectation of privacy test” looks to whether (1) a person
exhibits an “actual or subjective expectation of privacy” and (2) “the
expectation [is] one that society is prepared to recognize as
‘reasonable.’”280
Brandeis’ dissent in Olmstead only partially won the day in Katz.
Instead of adopting a conception of privacy that was adaptable to
technology, as the new reasonable expectation of privacy test initially had
promised to be, the Court rigidified its approach with a particular
conception of privacy—total secrecy. The Court centered this new
conception on the language in Katz, indicating that privacy turned on what
a person exposed to the public. In this way, privacy was conceptualized as
a form of secrecy, and one could not have a reasonable expectation of
privacy in information that was not kept secret.
The full implications of this new conception of privacy are discussed
in the next section. Before turning to this issue, it is important to observe
the effects of the Court’s failure to conceptualize privacy in Olmstead. As
a result of the nearly forty years between Olmstead and Katz, there has
been little control over the burgeoning use of electronic surveillance.
Electronic surveillance, one of the most powerful technological law
enforcement tools developed during the twentieth century, has profoundly
increased the government’s powers. The Fourth Amendment, however, has
stood by silently as this new technology has developed.
At the time of Olmstead, many viewed wiretapping with great unease.
Justice Holmes called it a “dirty business.”281 Even those who became its
greatest abusers had initially criticized it. J. Edgar Hoover testified in 1929
that “while it may not be illegal . . . [wiretapping] is unethical and it is not

279.
280.
281.

Id. at 351–52.
Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
Olmstead, 277 U.S. 438, 470 (1928) (Holmes, J., dissenting). See also RICHARD F. HIXSON,
PRIVACY IN A PUBLIC SOCIETY: HUMAN RIGHTS IN CONFLICT 49 (1987). For a history of the early days
of wiretapping, see Note, The Right to Privacy in Nineteenth Century America, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1892
(1981).
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permitted under the regulations by the Attorney General.”282 Hoover stated
that “any employee engaged in wire tapping will be dismissed from the
service of the bureau.”283
In 1934, just six years after Olmstead, Congress enacted § 605 of the
Federal Communications Act, making wiretapping a federal crime.
However, § 605 had significant limitations. It did not apply to wiretapping
by state law enforcement officials or by private parties. Nor did it apply to
bugging. Further, federal law enforcement officials interpreted § 605
merely to preclude the disclosure rather than the collection of intercepted
communications.284 The Supreme Court, however, held that § 605
precluded evidence obtained by wiretapping from being used in court.285
Although law enforcement officials could not use wiretapping evidence or
its fruits, § 605 failed to prevent them from installing devices and
listening.286
Gradually, presidents gave the FBI increasing authority to wiretap.287
In World War II, the FBI was authorized to engage in wiretapping to
investigate threats to national security. Later, the authorization for
wiretapping expanded to encompass domestic security. The fear of
communism during the 1950s resulted in further increases in the use of
electronic surveillance.288
As fears of Communism escalated and the authority to engage in
electronic surveillance increased, widespread abuses began to occur.
Hoover substantially abused his wiretapping authority by extensively
wiretapping FBI critics, individuals whose views he disliked, and the
enemies of his political allies.289 As discussed earlier, he engaged in
massive electronic surveillance of Martin Luther King, Jr.290 Presidents
also used the wiretapping power of the FBI for their own political purposes
and for domestic surveillance. President Nixon ordered extensive
wiretapping, including surveillance of his own speechwriter, William

282.
283.
284.

Fisher, supra note 238, at 127.
Id.
ROBERT ELLIS SMITH, BEN FRANKLIN’S WEB SITE: PRIVACY AND CURIOSITY FROM
PLYMOUTH ROCK TO THE INTERNET 158 (2000).
285. See Nardone v. United States, 302 U.S. 379 (1937) (evidence directly obtained by
wiretapping excluded from evidence); Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338 (1939) (evidence
obtained as the fruit of illegal wiretapping could not be used in court).
286. See SMITH, supra note 284, at 160.
287. See DIFFIE & LANDAU, supra note 128, at 155–65.
288. See DIFFIE & LANDAU, supra note 128, at 161–62.
289. See supra Part II.C.
290. See supra Part II.C.
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Safire.291 Presidents Kennedy and Johnson have also been accused of
ordering electronic surveillances for improper purposes.292 With regard to
pre-Katz wiretapping by the states, an influential study led by Samuel Dash
concluded that 90% of state wiretapping had been done without court
authorization and that state regulation of wiretapping had been largely
ineffective and impotent against abuses.293
Thus, for forty years, the government’s power to engage in electronic
surveillance has fallen outside of the reach of the Fourth Amendment, and
the legislation that has filled the void has been ineffective. Today, history
is in the process of repeating itself. The Court has made a mistake similar to
the one the Olmstead Court made, and it is one with severe and far-reaching
implications.
C. THE NEW OLMSTEAD
Although we have moved from the Boyd and Olmstead world of
physical papers and places to a new regime based upon expectations of
privacy, there is a new Olmstead, one that is just as shortsighted and rigid
in approach. The Court’s new conception of privacy is one of total secrecy.
If any information is exposed to the public or if law enforcement officials
can view something from any public vantage point, then the Court has
refused to recognize a reasonable expectation of privacy.
For example, in Florida v. Riley,294 the Court held that a person did
not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in his enclosed greenhouse
because a few roof panels were missing and the police were able to fly over
it with a helicopter.295 In California v. Greenwood,296 the police searched
plastic garbage bags that the defendant had left on the curb to be collected
by the trash collector. The Court held that there was no reasonable
expectation of privacy in the trash because “[i]t is common knowledge that
plastic bags left on or at the side of a public street are readily accessible to
animals, children, scavengers, snoops, and other members of the public.”297
The Court also reasoned that the trash was left at the curb “for the express
purpose of conveying it to a third party, the trash collector, who might

291.
292.
293.
294.
295.
296.
297.

See DIFFIE & LANDAU, supra note 128, at 144.
Id. at 173.
SAMUEL DASH, RICHARD SCHWARTZ, & ROBERT KNOWLTON, THE EAVESDROPPERS (1959).
488 U.S. 445 (1989).
See id. at 451–52.
486 U.S. 35 (1988).
Id. at 40.
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himself have sorted through [the] trash or permitted others, such as the
police, to do so.”298
Consistent with this conception of privacy, the Court held that there is
no reasonable expectation in privacy for information known or exposed to
third parties. In United States v. Miller,299 federal agents presented
subpoenas to two banks to produce all of the financial records of the
defendant. The banks produced the records but did not notify the defendant
of the subpoenas. The defendant challenged the subpoenas as a violation of
the Fourth Amendment. The Court held that there was no reasonable
expectation of privacy in financial records maintained by a bank.300 “[T]he
Fourth Amendment does not prohibit the obtaining of information revealed
to a third party and conveyed by him to Government authorities.”301 The
Court reasoned: “The checks are not confidential communications but
negotiable instruments to be used in commercial transactions. All of the
documents obtained, including financial statements and deposit slips,
contain only information voluntarily conveyed to the banks and exposed to
their employees in the ordinary course of business.”302
In Smith v. Maryland, police officers were attempting to track down a
robber who had begun making obscene and harassing phone calls.303 At
one point, the robber asked someone he had been calling to step out on her
front porch, where she observed him drive by in his car.304 The police
traced the license plate number and found that the car was registered to the
defendant.305 Without a warrant, the police asked the telephone company
to install a pen register to record the numbers dialed from the defendant’s
home.306 The Court concluded that there was no reasonable expectation of
privacy in pen registers.307 Since people “know that they must convey
numerical information to the phone company” and that the phone company
records this information for billing purposes, people cannot “harbor any
general expectation that the numbers they dial will remain secret.”308
298. Id.
299. 425 U.S. 435, 435 (1976).
300. Id. at 444.
301. Id. at 443.
302. Id. at 442.
303. 442 U.S. 735, 737 (1979).
304. Id.
305. Id.
306. Id. A pen register is a device that is typically installed at the telephone company’s offices
that can record the telephone numbers a person dials. A trap and trace device is a similar device that
can record the telephone numbers of a person’s incoming telephone traffic.
307. Id. at 743.
308. Id.
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Miller and Smith establish a general rule that if information is in the
hands of third parties, then an individual can have no reasonable
expectation of privacy in that information, which means that the Fourth
Amendment does not apply.309 Individuals thus probably do not have a
reasonable expectation of privacy in communications and records
maintained by ISPs or computer network system administrators.310
Two lines of cases support the third party doctrine. The first deals
with standing and the second deals with assumption of risk. The Court’s
modern standing doctrine emerges primarily from two cases, Rakas v.
Illinois311 and Rawlings v. Kentucky.312
In Rakas, the police seized evidence from the glove compartment of
an automobile with several passengers. The passengers moved to suppress
the seized evidence under the Fourth Amendment, but the Court held that
they had no standing to do so because they did not own the car and because
they claimed that they did not own the evidence in the glove compartment.
Said the Court, “[a] person who is aggrieved by an illegal search and
seizure only through the introduction of damaging evidence secured by a
search of a third person’s premises or property has not had any of his
Fourth Amendment rights infringed.”313
In Rawlings, a police officer ordered the defendant’s girlfriend to
empty the contents of her purse. Among the contents of the purse were
drugs that the defendant admitted belonged to him. The Court rejected the
defendant’s Fourth Amendment challenge because he had no reasonable
expectation of privacy once he entrusted the items to a third party.314
In addition to the standing doctrine, both Miller and Smith analogized
to a series of cases involving the assumption of risk doctrine. In Miller, the
Court noted that “the Fourth Amendment does not “prohibit the obtaining
of information revealed to a third party and conveyed by him to
Government authorities, even if the information is revealed on the
assumption that it will be used only for a limited purpose and the
confidence placed in the third party will not be betrayed.”315 In Smith, the

309. See ORIN S. KERR, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, SEARCHING AND SEIZING COMPUTERS AND
OBTAINING ELECTRONIC EVIDENCE IN CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIONS § I.B.3 (Jan. 2001).
310. Id. at § I.C.1(b)(iv).
311. 439 U.S. 128 (1978).
312. 448 U.S. 98 (1980).
313. Rakas, 439 U.S. at 134.
314. Rawlings, 448 U.S. at 104–06.
315. Miller, 425 U.S. at 443.
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Court stated that the defendant had “assumed the risk that the [phone]
company would reveal to the police the numbers he [had] dialed.”316
The assumption of risk doctrine emerged from a series of cases
dealing with informants and undercover agents. In these cases, either a
person had revealed information to a friend, who later divulged the
information to the police, or a person revealed the information to a police
informant or undercover officer.317 For example, in Hoffa v. United
States,318 the Court held that the Fourth Amendment did not apply where
the defendant made statements to an undercover informant while in his
hotel room.319 The Court reasoned that the undercover informant was “not
a surreptitious eavesdropper” but was invited in and trusted by the
defendant, who had relied “upon his misplaced confidence that [the
informant] would not reveal his wrongdoing.”320 In Lewis v. United
States,321 the defendant sold drugs to an undercover agent, and the Court
held that he had assumed the risk of betrayal.322 Likewise, in Lee v. United
States,323 the Court relied upon the assumption of risk doctrine to reject the
claim of a defendant who had revealed information to an informant who
was using a concealed transmitter that enabled the police to listen to the
conversation.324
The third party record doctrine, buttressed by the standing and
assumption of risk doctrines, stems from a particular conception of privacy
that views Fourth Amendment privacy as constituting a form of total
secrecy.325 Under this conception, privacy is a form of concealment, where
secrets are inaccessible to others. If information is not secret in this way, if
it is in any way exposed to others, then it loses its status as private.
Further, the Court views privacy as an individual right. Fourth
Amendment privacy is enforced at the behest of particular individuals via
the exclusionary rule. The problem with the Court’s current conception of
privacy is that it views the Fourth Amendment as protecting rights
316. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 744 (1979).
317. See, e.g., United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 750 (1971) (reasoning that the Fourth
Amendment does not protect information conveyed to a government informant who wears a radio
transmitter); On Lee v. United States, 343 U.S. 747, 754 (1952) (stating that the Fourth Amendment
does not apply when a person misplaces her trust by talking to a bugged government informant).
318. 385 U.S. 293 (1966).
319. Id. at 302.
320. Id.
321. 385 U.S. 206 (1966).
322. Id. at 210–11.
323. 343 U.S. at 747.
324. Id. at 751–52.
325. See Solove, supra note 7, at 1435.
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possessed by individuals seeking to suppress evidence. According to Mary
Coombs, the Court’s Fourth Amendment jurisprudence has applied too
much of an “individualistic conception of privacy” and has ignored privacy
as shared among groups of individuals.326 Since the Fourth Amendment
establishes an architecture of power, its protection should not turn on
whether an individual possesses the right. Rather the Amendment protects
rights by establishing a particular social structure, one that benefits society
by restricting government power. If we most want to protect innocent
parties, the Court’s standing doctrine thwarts this very goal.327
Dissenting in Rakas, Justices White, Brennan, Marshall, and Stevens
observed that the Court’s ruling “undercuts the force of the exclusionary
rule in the one area in which its use is most certainly justified—the
deterrence of bad-faith violations of the Fourth Amendment.”328 In
particular, the Justices observed:
This decision invites police to engage in patently unreasonable searches
every time an automobile contains more than one occupant. Should
something be found, only the owner of the vehicle, or of the item, will
have standing to seek suppression, and the evidence will presumably be
usable against the other occupants.329

Smith and Miller have been extensively criticized throughout the past
several decades. However, it is only recently that we are truly beginning to
see the profound implications of the Court’s third party doctrine. Smith and
Miller are the new Olmstead and Goldman. Gathering information from
third party records is an emerging law enforcement practice with as many
potential dangers as the wiretapping in Olmstead. “The progress of science
in furnishing the government with means of espionage is not likely to stop
with wiretapping,” Justice Brandeis observed in his Olmstead dissent.330
“Ways may some day be developed by which the government, without
removing papers from secret drawers, can reproduce them in court, and by

326. Mary I. Coombs, Shared Privacy and the Fourth Amendment, or the Rights of Relationships,
75 CAL. L. REV. 1593, 1594 (1987). See also Anthony G. Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth
Amendment, 58 Minn. L. Rev. 349, 367 (1974) (critiquing standing doctrine for viewing Fourth
Amendment protections as protecting “atomistic spheres of interest of individual citizens” rather than as
“regulation of governmental conduct”).
327. See, e.g., Coombs, supra note 326, at 1600 (stating that if the purpose of the exclusionary
rule is deterrence, then it should apply regardless of standing); Wasserstrom & Seidman, supra note
119, at 97 (same).
328. Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 168 (1978) (White, J., dissenting).
329. Id. at 168–69.
330. Olmstead, 277 U.S. 438, 474 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
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which it will be enabled to expose to a jury the most intimate occurrences
of the home.”331
That day is here. Government information gathering from the
extensive dossiers being assembled with modern computer technology
poses one of the most significant threats to privacy of our times. In the
void left by the inapplicability of the Fourth Amendment, Congress has
erected a statutory regime of protection, which establishes the current
architecture of power for government information gathering from third
party records. Unfortunately, this regime is woefully inadequate.
IV. THE NEW ARCHITECTURE OF POWER: THE EMERGING
STATUTORY REGIME AND ITS LIMITS
Throughout the twentieth century, when the Supreme Court held that
the Fourth Amendment was inapplicable to new practices or technology,
Congress often responded by passing statutes affording some level of
protection. Congress through a series of statutes has established a statutory
regime regulating government access to third party records. This regime
erects a particular architecture of power significantly different from that of
the Fourth Amendment. These differences are both substantive (the types
of records and information protected) and procedural (the means by which
government officials can obtain records). The architecture of this regime is
certainly preferable to a void, but is nevertheless substantially inferior to
that of the Fourth Amendment. In this Part, I undertake an analysis of this
regime, for it is the governing architecture of power for government
information-collection from the private sector. Unless the Court reverses
course in its Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, it is this regime that must
shoulder the burden of balancing order with liberty and keeping
government power under control.
A. STATUTORY REGIME ARCHITECTURE: SCOPE
1. Wiretapping and Bugging
When the Court held in Olmstead that the Fourth Amendment did not
apply to wiretapping, Congress responded six years later by enacting § 605
of the Federal Communications Act of 1934.332 Pursuant to § 605, “no
person not being authorized by the sender shall intercept any

331.
332.

Id.
Former 7 U.S.C. § 605.

SOLO10.DOC

2002]

9/3/02 8:49 AM

DISSIPATION OF FOURTH AMENDMENT PRIVACY

1139

communication and divulge or publish the existence, contents, substance,
purport, effect, or meaning of such intercepted communications to any
person.”333 Section 605 did not specify how it was to be enforced, but in
Nardone v. United States, the Court held that the exclusionary rule applied
in federal court to evidence obtained by wiretapping in violation of §
605.334 However, § 605 was a narrow law that did not apply to the states.
Consequently, wiretapping by state law enforcement officials was regulated
at the state level, and as an influential report concluded, state wiretapping
regulation was relatively ineffective.335 Further, § 605 did not cover other
means of electronic surveillance such as bugging. Finally, the Department
of Justice and the FBI interpreted § 605 as only preventing the
“divulgence” of information obtained by wiretapping in court, while not
prohibiting wiretapping if the information was not used at trial.336
Section 605 governed wiretapping until United States v. Katz, when
the Court finally declared that the Fourth Amendment covered wiretapping.
In 1968, Congress enacted the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets
Act.337 Title III of the Act substantially improved the law of wiretapping,
extending its reach to state officials as well as to private parties.338
In 1986, Congress amended Title III with the Electronic
Communications Privacy Act (ECPA). The ECPA restructured Title III
into three titles: Title I (known as the “Wiretap Act”), dealing with the
interception of communications;339 Title II (known as the “Stored
Communications Act”), covering access to stored communications and
records;340 and Title III (known as the “Pen Register Act”), dealing with
pen registers and trap and trace devices.341
Three types of communications are covered by the ECPA. A “wire
communication” consists of all “aural” transmissions that travel through a
wire, cable, or similar medium.342 “Aural” means that the transmission
must contain a human voice at some point.343 An “oral communication,” is
333. Id.
334. 302 U.S. 379 (1937).
335. See generally DASH, SCHWARTZ, & KNOWLTON, supra note 293.
336. WAYNE R. LAFAVE, JEROLD H. ISRAEL, & NANCY J. KING, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 260 (3d
ed. 2000).
337. Omnibus Crime and Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510–22 (2001).
338. See REGAN, supra note 141, at 122–25.
339. Wiretap Act, Electronic Communications Privacy Act, Title I, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510–22 (2001).
340. Stored Communications Act, Electronic Communications Privacy Act, Title II, 18 U.S.C. §§
2701–11 (2000).
341. Pen Register Act, Title III, 18 U.S.C. §§ 3121–27 (2000).
342. 18 U.S.C. § 2510(1) (2000).
343. 18 U.S.C. § 2510(18).
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one that is “uttered by a person exhibiting an expectation that such
communication is not subject to interception under circumstances justifying
such expectation.”344 Typically, oral communications are those intercepted
through bugging devices.345 Finally, the third type of communication
defined by the ECPA is an “electronic communication.” Electronic
communications are all nonwire and nonoral communications that can be
transferred through a wide variety of mechanisms.346 Typically these
consist of text and images (not the human voice)—an e-mail for
instance.347
Title I applies to wiretapping and bugging. A communication must be
intercepted in “flight,” during transmission. Title I thus somewhat overlaps
with the Fourth Amendment because under Katz, the Fourth Amendment
applies to wiretapping. Title I further contains an exclusionary rule,
making any unlawfully acquired evidence inadmissible.348 However, in a
significant limitation, the exclusionary rule does not apply to electronic
communications.349 Therefore, the interception of an e-mail is not
protected by the exclusionary rule.350
Title I has strict requirements for obtaining a court order in order to
engage in electronic surveillance.351
In certain respects, Title I’s
requirements are stricter than those for a Fourth Amendment search
warrant. For instance, Title I restricts the type of officials who may apply
for a court order and requires that the officials demonstrate that other
means for obtaining the information have been unsuccessful.352 A Title I
court order requires probable cause and a specific description of where the
communication will be intercepted, the type of communication, and the
period of time for the interception.353 Further, Title I limits the types of
crimes that can be investigated with electronic surveillance. For example, a
court order cannot be obtained to investigate a misdemeanor. Title I also
requires that the court order mandate that the interception be conducted in a

344.
345.
346.
347.
348.
349.
350.
351.
352.
353.

18 U.S.C. § 2510(2).
Id. § 2510(4).
Id. § 2510(12).
See id.
Id. § 2518 (10)(a) (2000).
See id.
See id.
Id. § 2518.
Id.
Id.
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way so as to “minimize the interception of communications not subject to
interception.”354
With the exception of electronic communications, which are not
protected by an exclusionary rule, Title I has substantial protections.
However, they cover ground already safeguarded by the Fourth
Amendment. As will be illustrated below, the architecture of the statutory
regime is much weaker and more porous in the areas not protected by the
Fourth Amendment.
2. Stored Communications
Communications service providers frequently store their customers’
communications. These probably fall under the third party-record rule of
Smith v. Maryland355 and United States v. Miller356 because third parties
maintain the information.357
Although the Fourth Amendment may not protect stored
communications, Title II of the ECPA provides some protection. Title II
governs stored communications, such as those stored by a phone company
or ISP.358 ISPs temporarily store e-mail communications. For example,
suppose Doe sends an e-mail to Roe. The e-mail travels to Roe’s ISP and
sits there until Roe logs on and downloads her e-mail. Under certain
circumstances, a copy of that e-mail may even be kept by Roe’s ISP after it
is downloaded. With many ISPs, users can also keep copies of previously
read e-mail on the ISP’s server. Maintaining copies of previously read email with an ISP can be particularly useful, since this enables a person to
access the e-mails from remote locations via the Internet. Conversely, if a
copy of an e-mail is not kept on the ISP’s computer, then it can be accessed
only from the particular computer to which it was downloaded.
Additionally, ISPs often maintain an outbox folder that contains copies of
all the e-mail that a person has sent out.
Title II restricts the government’s ability to access communications
stored by Roe’s ISP.359 Unfortunately, Title II is quite confusing and its
protection is limited. Electronic storage is defined as “any temporary,
354. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(5).
355. 442 U.S. 735, 735 (1979).
356. 425 U.S. 435, 435 (1976).
357. This conclusion is debatable, however, because telephone companies can also store telephone
communications, and it is unlikely that the Court would go so far as to say that this fact eliminates any
reasonable expectation of privacy in such communications.
358. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701–71.
359. Id. § 2701.
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intermediate storage of a wire or electronic communication incidental to
the electronic transmission thereof,” and “any storage of such
communication by an electronic communication service for purposes of
backup protection.”360 This definition clearly covers e-mail that is waiting
on the ISP’s server to be downloaded. However, what about e-mail that
has been downloaded by the recipient but maintained by the user on the
ISP’s server? According to the Department of Justice’s interpretation of
Title II, the copy of the e-mail stored on the server is no longer in
temporary storage, and is therefore “simply a remotely stored file.”361 Title
II permits law enforcement officials to obtain copies of these
communications merely by issuing a subpoena to the ISP.362
Therefore, the process required for government officials to obtain
access to stored communications is considerably less stringent than the
Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement. Under Title II, the government
must only secure a warrant to obtain the contents of communications in
electronic storage for 180 days or less.363 In the DOJ’s view, these
communications encompass only unopened e-mail and not previously
accessed e-mail stored on an ISP’s server. For communications stored over
180 days, the government need only obtain an administrative, grand jury or
trial subpoena, or a court order.364 No probable cause is required. The
government must only offer “specific and articulable facts showing that
there are reasonable grounds” to believe communications are “relevant” to
the criminal investigation.365 Recall that Title II does not have an
exclusionary rule.
3. Records of Communications Providers
Title II also governs a communications service provider’s disclosure
of customer records to the government. These provisions differ from the
parts of Title II that govern stored communications.
Stored
communications consist of the traffic of one’s correspondence with others,
while customer records consist of information about the customer including
360. 18 U.S.C. § 2510(17) (emphasis added).
361. KERR, supra note 309, § III.B.
362. Id. at § III.D.1. The government must provide prior or delayed notice to the individual. See
18 U.S.C. § 2703(b)(1)(B)(i) & (b)(2).
363. 18 U.S.C. § 2703(a).
364. Id. § 2703(b).
365. Id. § 2703(d). If the government does not want to provide prior notice to the subscriber that
it is seeking the information, it must obtain a warrant. Id. § 2703(b). However, in a number of
circumstances, notice can be delayed for up to three months after information has been obtained. Id. §
2705.
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name, address, phone numbers, billing records, and types of services the
customer has utilized.366 Recently, the USA-PATRIOT Act has expanded
the information that can be obtained from customer records with a
subpoena to include “records of session times and durations,” “any
temporarily assigned network address,” and “any credit card or bank
account number” used for payment.367
Under Title II, a communications service provider “shall disclose a
record or other information” about a customer when the government
obtains a court order.368 A Title II court order only requires that the
government provide “specific and articulable facts showing that there are
reasonable grounds to believe that . . . the records or other information
sought, are relevant and material to an ongoing criminal investigation.”369
One of the most important pieces of information an ISP has in its
records is the customer’s identity. A customer may use a pseudonym (a
screen name), and an ISP may have information linking that pseudonym to
the customer’s real name. Thus, an ISP often holds the key to one’s ability
to communicate anonymously on the Internet. The government often wants
to obtain this information to identify a particular speaker.
For example, in United States v. Hambrick,370 a police officer served
the defendant’s ISP, Mindspring, with a blatantly invalid subpoena that had
been “judicially” authorized by another police officer.371 Although the
court recognized that the subpoena was invalid, the evidence was not
suppressed due to Title II’s lack of an exclusionary remedy.372
In United States v. Kennedy, an anonymous person called an employee
at Road Runner (the defendant’s ISP) and informed him that while
scanning other computers on the Internet, he had discovered child
pornography on the computer of the defendant, who was a Road Runner
customer.373 The caller gave Road Runner the Internet Protocol (IP)
address of the defendant’s computer.374 Road Runner then contacted the
FBI.375 The FBI obtained a court order for the defendant’s subscriber

366.
367.
368.
369.
370.
371.
372.
373.
374.
375.

18 U.S.C. § 2703(c)(1)(C).
Id. § 2703(c)(2), amended by USA-PATRIOT Act § 210.
Id. § 2703(c)(1)(B).
Id. § 2703(d).
55 F. Supp.2d 504 (W.D. Va. 1999).
Id. at 506.
See id. at 509.
81 F.Supp.2d 1103, 1106 (D. Kan. 2000).
Id.
Id.
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information.376 Eventually this led to the defendant’s conviction for
possession of child pornography.377 The court rejected the defendant’s
Fourth Amendment claim based on the third party doctrine: “When the
defendant entered into an agreement with Road Runner for Internet service,
he knowingly revealed all information connected to [his] IP address.”378
Instead, Title II applied, and the court concluded had that the court order
was defective because the government’s application failed to state enough
specific facts to meet Title II’s requirements. However, the court noted
that there was no suppression remedy for such violations.379
4. Pen Registers, E-mail Headers, and Websurfing
The ECPA also attempts to fill the void left by Smith v. Maryland by
addressing pen registers and trap and trace devices. Under Title III of the
ECPA, the government must obtain a court order before installing and
using a pen register or trap and trace device.380 However, the court order
merely requires that the government demonstrate that “the information
likely to be obtained by such installation and use is relevant to an ongoing
criminal investigation.”381 In contrast to the Fourth Amendment, probable
cause is not required, nor must the target be a criminal suspect. Once the
government official makes the proper certification, the court must issue the
order. Consequently, courts have little discretion in granting Title III
orders.382 Orders can last up to sixty days.383 Finally, there is no
exclusionary rule for Title III violations.
The USA-PATRIOT Act of 2001 has substantially enlarged the
definition of pen registers and trap and trace devices. Where before a pen
register was defined as a device that records “the numbers dialed . . . on the
telephone line,” the new definition encompasses devices and processes that
record “dialing, routing, addressing, or signaling information” for a wide
variety of transmission facilities beyond telephone lines.384 A pen register
now applies to addressing information on e-mails and to “IP addresses.”385

376. Id.
377. Id. at 1104.
378. Id. at 1110.
379. See id. at 1111.
380. 18 U.S.C. § 3121(a) (1994).
381. Id. § 3123(a) (1994).
382. “Upon application made under section 3122(a)(1), the court shall enter an ex parte order
authorizing the installation and use of a pen register or trap and trace device. . . .” Id. § 3123 (a)(1).
383. Id. § 3123(c).
384. Id. § 3127(3), as amended by USA-PATRIOT Act § 216.
385. Id.
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An IP address is the unique address assigned to a particular computer
connected to the Internet. All computers connected to the Internet have an
IP address. All websites also have an IP address. Consequently, a list of IP
addresses accessed reveals the various websites that a person has visited.
Because websites are often distinctively tailored to particular topics and
interests, a comprehensive list of them can reveal a lot about a person’s life.
5. Financial Records
Congress has filled the void created by United States v. Miller, which
held that bank records are not protected by the Fourth Amendment. The
Right to Financial Privacy Act (RFPA) requires that government officials
first obtain a warrant or subpoena before accessing financial information.386
The subpoena merely requires a “reason to believe that the records sought
are relevant to a legitimate law enforcement inquiry.”387 The customer
must be served with the subpoena prior to its service on the financial
institution. Notice, however, can be delayed in a number of
circumstances.388 When information is “relevant to legitimate law
enforcement inquiry” and subpoena authority is not available to the
government, the government need only submit a formal written request for
the information.389
In addition to banks, credit-reporting agencies have detailed records
for nearly every adult American consumer. Under the Fair Credit
Reporting Act (FCRA) of 1970, a consumer reporting agency “may furnish
identifying information respecting any consumer, limited to his name,
address, former addresses, places of employment, or former places of
employment, to a governmental agency.”390 Thus, the government can
simply request this information without any court involvement. If the
government desires to obtain additional information contained in credit
reports, it must obtain a court order or grand jury subpoena.391 The FCRA
focuses on consumer reporting agencies. Nothing in the FCRA limits the
recipients of credit reports from disclosing them to the government. Credit
reports about an individual are frequently supplied to a variety of entities,
such as banks, creditors, landlords, and employers.
386. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 3401–22 (1994). For more information on the RFPA, see George B.
Trubow & Dennis L. Hudson, The Right to Financial Privacy Act of 1978: New Protection from
Federal Intrusion, 12 J. MARSHALL J. PRAC. & PROC. 487 (1979).
387. 29 U.S.C. § 3407.
388. Id. § 3409.
389. Id. § 3408.
390. 15 U.S.C. § 1681f (2000).
391. Id. § 1681b(a)(1).
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Additionally, the FCRA requires a credit reporting agency to furnish
the FBI with a list of all financial institutions where a person maintains an
account “when presented with a written request” signed by the FBI director
or designee.392 This provision is limited to foreign counterintelligence
investigations and to individuals believed to be foreign agents.393
Although the RFPA and FCRA protect financial information
maintained by banks and credit reporting agencies, the government can
obtain financial information from ISPs, employers, landlords, merchants,
creditors, and database companies, among others. Therefore, financial
records are protected based only on which entities possess them. Thus, the
statutory regime merely provides partial protection of financial data.
6. Electronic Media Entertainment Records
The statutory regime protects records pertaining to certain forms of
electronic media entertainment. Cable records are afforded a substantial
amount of protection. Cable service providers maintain records about their
customers, including the fee-based channels, such as HBO, to which the
customer subscribes along with the pay-per-view movies a customer
orders. Under the Cable Communications Policy Act (Cable Act) of
1984,394 a government official must obtain a court order in order to obtain
cable records. The government must offer “clear and convincing evidence
that the subject of the information is reasonably suspected of engaging in
criminal activity and that the information sought would be material
evidence in the case.”395 Further, the subject of the information can
“appear and contest” the court order.396 This standard is more stringent
than the Fourth Amendment’s probable cause and warrant requirements.
However, there is no exclusionary rule under the Cable Act. The USAPATRIOT Act has limited the Cable Act by providing that it does not apply
to cable Internet service.397 Thus, where a cable service provider acts as an
ISP, the ECPA governs, not the Cable Act.
In addition to cable records, the statutory regime also protects video
tape rental records. The Video Privacy Protection Act (VPPA) of 1988,398
which was passed after reporters hadobtained Supreme Court Justice
392.
393.
394.
395.
396.
397.
398.

15 U.S.C. § 1681u.
See id.
47 U.S.C. § 551 (1994).
Id. § 551(h)(1).
Id. § 551(h)(2).
USA-PATRIOT Act § 211.
18 U.S.C. § 2710 (2001).
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Nominee Robert Bork’s video cassette rental records, states that a video
tape service provider may disclose customer records to law enforcement
officials “pursuant to a warrant . . . , an equivalent State warrant, a grand
jury subpoena, or a court order.”399 Therefore, unlike the Cable Act, the
level of protection under the VPPA is much less stringent.
Although the statutory regime protects the records of certain forms of
electronic media entertainment, it fails to protect the records of many
others. For example, records from music stores, electronics merchants, and
Internet media entities are afforded no protection.
7. Medical Records
The recently promulgated federal health privacy rules, pursuant to the
Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) of 1996,400
permit law enforcement officials to access medical records with a warrant,
court order, or subpoena.401 Health information may also be disclosed “in
response to a law enforcement official’s request for such information for
the purpose of identifying or locating a suspect, fugitive, material witness,
or missing person.”402 Similar to the statutes governing other records,
health information can be obtained with a mere subpoena.
Not all health records, however, are covered by HIPAA. Only records
maintained by health plans, health care clearinghouses, and health care
providers are covered.403 Doctors, hospitals, pharmacists, health insurers,
and Health Maintenance Organizations (HMOs) are covered, but third
parties that may have medical information are not covered. Only
organizations that engage in “standard transactions” under HIPAA’s
administrative simplification process for health insurance claims fall within
the protections of the regulations.404
For example, the sale of
nonprescription drugs and the rendering of medical advice by many
Internet health websites are not covered by HIPAA.405 As a recent report
about the limits of HIPAA has concluded:
Many Web sites offer a “health assessment” feature where users may
enter all sorts of information from height and weight to drug and alcohol
399.
400.
401.
402.
403.
404.

Id. § 2710(b)(2)(C).
The regulations are published at 45 C.F.R. §§ 160–64 (2001).
45 C.F.R. § 164.512(f)(1)(ii) (2001).
Id. § 164.512(f)(2).
Id. § 160.102 (2001).
PEW INTERNET & AMERICAN LIFE PROJECT, INSTITUTE FOR HEALTHCARE RESEARCH AND
POLICY, GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY, EXPOSED ONLINE: WHY THE NEW FEDERAL HEALTH PRIVACY
REGULATION DOESN’T OFFER MUCH PROTECTION TO INTERNET USERS 6–8 (Nov. 2001).
405. See id. at 7.
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use. . . . For example, HealthStatus.com offers free general health
assessments as well as disease specific assessments to determine an
individual’s risk for some of the leading causes of death. . . . [B]ecause
HealthStatus.com does not accept any insurance it will not be covered by
the privacy rule. . . .406

Therefore, while certain health records are protected, many are not.
8. Holes in the Regime
Federal statutes provide some coverage of the void left by the
inapplicability of the Fourth Amendment to records held by third parties.
Although they apply to various types of information, such as
communication records, financial records, entertainment records, and
health records, these records are only protected when in the hands of
certain third parties. Thus, the statutory regime does not protect records
based on the type of information contained in the records, but protects them
based on the particular types of third parties that possess them.
Additionally, there are gaping holes in the statutory regime of
protection, with classes of records not protected at all. Such records
include those of merchants, both online and offline. Records held by
bookstores, department stores, restaurants, clubs, gyms, employers, and
other companies are not protected. Additionally, all the personal
information amassed in profiles by database companies is not protected.
There is a significant amount of activity on the Internet that is not
covered by the ECPA, such as information collected by websites. For
example, consider In Re DoubleClick, Inc. Privacy Litigation,407 where the
court concluded that the use and access of cookies by DoubleClick did not
violate the ECPA because the “DoubleClick-affiliated Web sites had
consented to DoubleClick’s access of plaintiffs’ communications to
them.”408 Moreover, records maintained by Internet retailers and websites
are often not considered “communications” under the ECPA.
Thus, the statutory regime is limited in its scope and has glaring
omissions and gaps. Further, the statutes are often complicated and
confusing, and their protection turns on technical distinctions that can leave
wide fields of information virtually unprotected.

406.
407.
408.

Id. at 14, 17.
154 F. Supp. 2d 497, 497 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).
See id. at 511.
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B. STATUTORY REGIME ARCHITECTURE: STRUCTURE
Even where the statutory regime applies, it is deficient in the
procedures it adopts to regulate the government’s access to third party
records. The statutory regime permits information to be obtained via court
order of subpoenas—a significant departure from the Fourth Amendment
which generally requires warrants supported by probable cause to be issued
by a neutral and detached magistrate.
Unlike warrants, subpoenas do not require probable cause and can be
issued without judicial approval. Prosecutors, not neutral judicial officers,
can issue subpoenas.409 According to Stuntz: “[W]hile searches typically
require probable cause or reasonable suspicion and sometimes require a
warrant, subpoenas require nothing, save that the subpoena not be
unreasonably burdensome to its target. Few burdens are deemed
unreasonable.”410 According to Ronald Degnan, subpoenas are not issued
“with great circumspection” and are often “handed out blank in batches and
filled in by lawyers.”411 As Stuntz contends, federal subpoena power is
“akin to a blank check.”412
Prosecutors can also use grand jury subpoenas to obtain third party
records.413 Grand jury subpoenas are “presumed to be reasonable” and
may only be quashed if “there is no reasonable possibility that the category
of materials the Government seeks will produce information relevant to the
general subject of the grand jury investigation.”414 As Stuntz observes,
grand jury subpoenas “are much less heavily regulated” than search
warrants:
As long as the material asked for is relevant to the grand jury’s
investigation and as long as compliance with the subpoena is not too
burdensome, the subpoena is enforced. No showing of probable cause or
reasonable suspicion is necessary, and courts measure relevance and
burden with a heavy thumb on the government’s side of the scales.415

409. Fisher, supra note 238, at 152.
410. Stuntz, supra note 252, at 857–58.
411. Ronan E. Degnan, Obtaining Witnesses and Documents (or Things), 108 F.R.D. 223, 232
(1986).
412. Stuntz, supra note 252, at 864.
413. Grand juries are still used in some states as well as in the federal system. See Degnan, supra
note 411, at 229.
414. United States v. R. Enter., Inc., 498 U.S. 292, 301 (1991).
415. Stuntz, supra note 215, at 1038.
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Therefore, courts “quash or modify” subpoenas only “if compliance
would be unreasonable or oppressive.”416 Further, “judges decide these
motions by applying vague legal standards case by case.”417
Court orders under most of the statutes are not much more constrained
than subpoenas. They typically require mere “relevance” to an ongoing
criminal investigation, a standard significantly lower and looser than
probable cause.
The problem with subpoenas and court orders is that the judiciary has
very limited oversight powers. The role of the judge in issuing or
reviewing subpoenas is to determine the extent of the burden of producing
the evidence. With this focus, financial hardship in producing information
would give courts more pause when reviewing subpoenas than the potential
invasions of privacy. The role of the judiciary in court orders is also quite
restricted. For example, an order to install a pen register or trap and trace
device under the ECPA merely requires that the applicant certify that the
information sought be relevant to an ongoing criminal investigation.418
Courts cannot look beyond the certification nor inquire into the truthfulness
of the facts in the application. As one court has observed, the “judicial role
in approving use of trap and trace devices is ministerial in nature.”419 In
short, judicial involvement with subpoenas and court orders amounts to
nothing more than a rubber stamp of judicial legitimacy.
In contrast, judges engage in a meaningful presearch review under the
architecture of the Fourth Amendment. Stronger standards force law
enforcement officials to be more careful when applying for a warrant to
engage in a search.
The current statutory regime that has attempted to fill the void created
by the judicial evisceration of the Fourth Amendment is inadequate
because it results in the de facto watering down of the warrant and probable
cause requirements of the Fourth Amendment. As warrants supported by
probable cause are replaced by subpoenas and court orders supported by
“articulable facts” that are “relevant” to an investigation, the role of the
judge in the process is diminished to nothing more than a decorative seal of
approval. In many circumstances, neither court orders nor subpoenas are
required. The government can simply ask for the information. An

416.
417.
418.
419.
§ IV.B.

Oklahoma Press Pub. Co. v. Walling Wage, and Hour Admin., 327 U.S. 186, 208–09 (1946).
Stuntz, supra note 252, at 867.
18 U.S.C. § 3123(a).
United States v. Fregoso, 60 F.3d 1314, 1320 (8th Cir. 1995). See also KERR, supra note 309,
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individual’s privacy is protected only by the vague and toothless privacy
policies of the companies holding their information.
V. RECONSTRUCTING THE ARCHITECTURE
Today, much of our personal information is finding its way into the
hands of third parties. Moreover, given the Court’s current conception of
privacy under the Fourth Amendment, the architecture of power that
regulates many of the government’s information-gathering practices is
increasingly that of a confusing and gap-riddled statutory regime.
One solution to fill the void is for the Court to reverse Smith v. Maryland
and United States v. Miller. Although Fourth Amendment architecture is
significantly more protective than that of the statutory regime, the problem
of how to regulate government access to third party records is not
adequately addressed by Fourth Amendment architecture alone. As
discussed earlier, the principal remedy for Fourth Amendment violations is
the exclusionary rule, which prevents the government from introducing
improperly obtained data during a criminal prosecution. However, many
information-gathering abuses often occur in the absence of prosecutions.
Therefore, the exclusionary rule is not sufficiently protective.
A better architecture of power to regulate government informationgathering from third parties should be constructed. In particular, such an
architecture of power should prevent the types of problems associated with
government information-gathering discussed earlier in Part II.C. An
architecture should address minimization, particularization, and control.
First, government information-gathering should be minimized. Sweeping
investigations and vast stores of personal data in the hands of government
entities present significant opportunities for the problematic uses discussed
earlier. Second, efforts at gathering data should be particularized to
specific individuals suspected of criminal involvement. Particularization
requires law enforcement officials to exercise care in selecting the
individuals who should be investigated, and it prevents dragnet
investigations that primarily involve innocent people. One of the most
important aspects of keeping the government under control is to prevent its
investigatory powers from being turned loose on the population at large.
Third, government information-gathering and use must be controlled.
There must be some meaningful form of supervision over the government’s
information-gathering activity to ensure that it remains minimized and
particularized. Further, government information uses must be controlled to
prevent abuses, drifts in the uses of information, and security lapses.
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The aims of the architecture, however, are not the most difficult issue.
Substantively, the architecture needs a scope. Which informationgathering activities should fall within the architecture’s scope?
Procedurally, the architecture needs a mechanism for carrying out its aims.
What type of structural controls should an architecture adopt?
A. SCOPE: SYSTEM OF RECORDS
An architecture begins with substance. It must provide guidance
about which information-gathering activities it governs. What is the
appropriate scope of an architecture regulating government informationgathering? In particular, should the architecture cover all instances where
the government gathers personal data from third parties? Restricting all
information gathering from third parties would prevent law enforcement
officials from gathering initial information essential in developing
sufficient evidence to establish probable cause. For example, witnesses
and victims are third parties that have information about the defendant. If
third parties are defined broadly, then the architecture could constrain the
police substantially, perhaps impeding their ability to interview people
when investigating a crime.420
Consequently, a line must be drawn to distinguish the instances where
third parties can voluntarily supply information to the government and
where the government will be prohibited from accessing information or
otherwise be restrained prior to procuring the data. Although we may want
to prevent Amazon.com from divulging to the government the log of books
a person bought, we may not want to prohibit a person’s neighbor or a
stranger from telling the police which books she happened to observe the
person reading.
An architecture must provide guidance for where the line is drawn.
One way to draw the line is to focus on the type of data involved,
distinguishing between “private” and “nonprivate” information. The
architecture would protect all personal information that is private.
However, how is privacy to be defined? The Court has defined privacy as
total secrecy. But this conception excludes most information held by third
parties from the scope of protection.
Another way to define private information is to focus on “intimate”
information. A number of commentators have contended that intimacy is
420. The early stages of government investigations frequently involve talking to victims,
witnesses, friends, and neighbors. The police often find out about a crime when people voluntarily
report suspicious activity.
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the essential characteristic of privacy. For example, according to Julie
Inness, “privacy’s content covers intimate information, access, and
decisions.”421 According to Tom Gerety, “[i]ntimacy is the chief restricting
concept in the definition of privacy.”422 However, what constitutes
“intimate” information? Without an adequate definition, “intimate”
becomes nothing more than a synonym for “private.” Commentators
attempting to give substance to the word “intimacy” have defined the word
too narrowly. For example, Jeffrey Reiman views intimate information as
pertaining to certain kinds of loving and caring relationships.423 Much
private information, such as financial and health data, however, does not
pertain to these types of relationships.
The more fundamental problem with focusing on whether information
is private is that privacy is a product of context, not the status of particular
facts. Easy distinctions such as intimate versus nonintimate and secret
versus nonsecret fail to account for the complex nature of what is
considered private. Privacy is a dimension of social practices, activities,
customs, and norms that are shaped by history and culture.424 The matters
that are considered private and public have changed throughout history.
Privacy is not a property of particular forms of information, since one can
always lose privacy with respect to very sensitive and revealing facts about
oneself. For example, the fact that a person has leprosy may be considered
private information. But if that person becomes a public advocate for
leprosy research and willingly announces to the public at large that she
suffers from leprosy, the information is no longer private. Few would say
that the fact that President Franklin Roosevelt suffered from polio remains
a private matter today. Certainly, public disclosure does not eliminate the
privacy of information; indeed, even information that is exposed to others
may retain its private character.425 Nevertheless, privacy depends upon
degrees of accessibility of information, and under certain circumstances,
even highly sensitive information may not be private.

421. JULIE. C. INNESS, PRIVACY, INTIMACY, AND ISOLATION 56 (1992).
422. Tom Gerety, Redefining Privacy, 12 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 233, 263 (1977). For other
commentators adopting an intimacy conception of privacy, see Robert S. Gerstein, Intimacy and
Privacy, in PHILOSOPHICAL DIMENSIONS OF PRIVACY: AN ANTHOLOGY 265 (Ferdinand David
Schoeman ed. 1984), and Jeffrey H. Reiman, Privacy, Intimacy, and Personhood, in PHILOSOPHICAL
DIMENSIONS OF PRIVACY: AN ANTHOLOGY, at 300.
423. James Rachels, Why Privacy Is Important, in PHILOSOPHICAL DIMENSIONS OF PRIVACY: AN
ANTHOLOGY, supra note 422, at 305–06.
424. See Solove, supra note 17, at 1129–30.
425. See Solove, supra note 50, at 1176–84.
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Additionally, focusing on the type of information does not solve the
problem of distinguishing between the neighbor’s tells the police what
books he sees a person reading and Amazon.com’s providing the police
with a complete inventory of the books the person has purchased. By
attempting to draw a line based upon the type of information, these two
instances would be treated similarly. Another example more radically
illustrates the problem. Many would deem information about a person’s
genitals to be private information. Should the police be required to obtain a
warrant before talking to a victim of a sexual assault about an assailant’s
genitals? To many this would be absurd. On the other hand, many would
express serious objections if the police, without probable cause, could
simply compel information about a person’s genitals from treating
physicians.
Further, making distinctions based on the particular status of certain
forms of information fails to account for what I call the “aggregation
problem.” This problem is caused by the accumulation of details. A fact
here or there may seem innocuous but when combined, they become more
telling about that person. Similar to a Seurat painting, where a multitude of
dots juxtaposed together form a picture, bits of information when
aggregated paint a portrait about a person.
Another way that a line could be drawn is based upon people’s
expectations. Such an approach would draw from the Court’s notion of
“reasonable expectations of privacy.” The problem with this approach,
however, is that an empirical evaluation of expectations alone could
gradually lead to the diminishment of privacy as more and more people
come to expect that the records held by third parties can be readily obtained
by the government.426
If a line cannot be drawn based upon the type of information involved
or people’s expectations of privacy, then how should the line be drawn?
The answer must focus on relationships. Privacy is not independent of the
relationships of which it is a part. Individuals readily share information in
certain private relationships, such as the family. In particular relationships
people undertake certain risks including the risk of betrayal by one with
whom confidences are shared. The fact that there are expectations and

426. See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 740–41 n.5 (1979) (noting that “where an individual’s
subjective expectations had been ‘conditioned’ by influences alien to well-recognized Fourth
Amendment freedoms, those subjective expectations obviously could play no meaningful role in
ascertaining what the scope of Fourth Amendment protection was”).
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risks, however, does not mean that they must be the exclusive focus of our
inquiry.
The issue is not the conceivable risk of betrayal, but rather which risks
people ought to assume and which risks people should be insured against.
This determination has a normative dimension. When a patient discloses
an ailment to a doctor, arguably the patient assumes the risk that the doctor
will disclose the information to the public. However, there are several
protections against this risk. First, patient-physician confidentiality is
preserved by norms of professional conduct for physicians established by
ethical rules. These rules include the Hippocratic Oath, which provides:
“Whatever, in connection with my professional service, or not in
connection with it, I see or hear, in the life of men, which ought not to be
spoken of abroad, I will not divulge, as reckoning that all such should be
kept secret.”427 Modern codes of medical ethics also require that
physicians keep patient information confidential428 or risk losing their
licenses for improper disclosures. Patient-physician confidentiality is also
protected in court with an evidentiary privilege.429 Further, courts have
created tort law causes of action against physicians who disclose personal
information.430 Finally, states have passed laws that protect against the
disclosure of medical information.431 Thus, in numerous ways, the law
structures the patient-physician relationship to protect against the risk of
disclosure. Similarly, the law of evidence has recognized the importance of
protecting the privacy of communications between attorney and client,432
priest and penitent,433 husband and wife,434 and psychotherapist and

427. Oath and Law of Hippocrates (circa 400 B.C.).
428. See Current Opinions of the Judicial Council of the Amer. Med. Ass’n Canon 5.05 (1984)
(observing that “the information disclosed to a physician during the course of the relationship between
the physician and patient is confidential to the greatest possible degree”).
429. See, e.g., Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 6–7 (1996) (recognizing psychotherapist-patient
privilege and social worker-patient privilege under the Federal Rules of Evidence); GLEN
WEISSENBERGER, FEDERAL RULE OF EVIDENCE: RULES, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, COMMENTARY AND
AUTHORITY § 501.8.
430. See, e.g., Hammonds v. AETNA Casualty and Surety Co., 243 F. Supp. 793, 799 (D. Ohio
1965); Simonsen v. Swenson, 177 N.W. 831, 832 (Neb. 1920). Courts, however, have made exceptions
in circumstances where disclosures must be made to protect the public. Simonsen, 177 N.W. at 832.
They have even imposed tort liability when physicians or psychotherapists fail to disclose data that
could lead to imminent harm. Tarasoff v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 551 P.2d 334, 353 (Cal. 1976).
431. See, e.g., Cal. Health & Safety Code § 199.21 (prohibiting disclosure of HIV test results);
N.Y. Pub. Health L. § 17 (prohibiting disclosure of minors’ medical records pertaining to sexually
transmitted diseases and abortion).
432. See Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981).
433. See WEISSENBERGER, supra note 429, at 190.
434. See id.
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patient.435 Our expectations in these relationships are the product of both
existing norms and the norm-shaping power of the law. As Christopher
Slobogin notes, “in a real sense, we only assume those risks of unregulated
government intrusion that the courts tell us we have to assume.”436
Therefore, the scope of the architecture should be shaped by
considerations regarding social relationships. The architecture’s scope
should encompass all instances when third parties share personal
information (in other words, information pertaining to individuals)
contained within a “system of records.” This term is taken from the
Privacy Act, which defines a “system of records” as “a group of any
records under the control of any agency from which information is
retrieved by the name of the individual or by some identifying number,
symbol, or other identifying particular assigned to the individual.”437 A
“system of records” is used to distinguish between collecting information
by speaking with specific individuals versus obtaining it through the vast
stores of records held by companies.
The problems described in Part II stem from the nature of
relationships with certain third parties and the problems of the
government’s collection and use of personal information. Therefore, the
inquiry should focus on at least two sets of relationships: relationships with
the government and relationships with the third parties that possess
personal information.
In relationships with the government, the focus should be on what the
collective society wants the government to be able to know rather than
whether certain matters are public or private based on the extent of their
exposure to others. The Court’s conception of privacy assumes that the
government stands in the same shoes as everybody else, which is clearly
not the case. If we allow a loved one to read our diary, do we also want to
the government to be able to read it? As Anthony Amsterdam has
observed: “For the tenement dweller, the difference between observation
by neighbors and visitors who ordinarily use the common hallways and
observation by policemen who come into hallways to ‘check up’ or ‘look
around’ is the difference between all the privacy that his condition allows
and none.”438

435. Jaffee, 518 U.S. at 15.
436. Christopher Slobogin, Technologically-Assisted Physical Surveillance: The American Bar
Association’s Tentative Draft Standards, 10 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 383, 400 (1997).
437. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(5) (2000).
438. Amsterdam, supra note 326, at 404.
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Indeed, the existence of Fourth Amendment limits indicates that the
government stands in a different position than ordinary citizens or private
sector organizations. The possibility of aggregation and the rise of digital
dossiers argue in favor of regulating the government’s access to
information.
One cannot lose sight of the fact that an architecture of power is being
developed. The focus should be on the goals of the architecture rather than
on technical distinctions over whether information is intimate enough or
secret enough. These questions should not derail attention from the
important issue of whether government information-gathering activities
present sufficient actual and potential dangers to warrant protection. The
problems discussed earlier regarding information flows from the private
sector to the government stem from the extensiveness of the personal
information that private sector entities are gathering today. Focusing on
“systems of records” targets the type of information flow that raises
concern. Because the problem of modern government informationgathering is caused by the increasing dossiers maintained in private sector
record systems, the architecture targets those third parties that store data in
record systems.
Our relationships with the entities that maintain record systems about
us differ from other social relationships. Records are a more detailed and
systematic form of information gathering. Though it is possible for the
government to obtain personal data by interviewing friends and others, this
is minimal compared to the systematic and profound sweep of information
accessible through private sector record systems. The information in
records is more permanent in nature and is readily aggregated. Thus,
record systems are particularly dangerous because of their extensiveness
and the ease with which information can be gathered, combined, stored,
and analyzed.
Further, entities that maintain systems of records collect data in a
power dynamic where information disclosure is often not consensual. A
person can take considerable steps to prevent a stranger from gathering data
without consent. For example, a person who is overzealous in gathering
information can be subject to laws prohibiting stalking or harassment.
Relationships to employers and landlords, however, are different than
those with our friends, neighbors, and even strangers. Currently,
employers and landlords have a substantial amount of power to gather
personal information. They often stand in an unequal position to that of the
individual employees or tenants. The nature of the relationship with
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employers and landlords provides them with a significantly greater amount
of power and control with regard to information gathering. Moreover, the
law often shapes these relationships to maintain or even further this
disequilibrium of power.
Relationships with merchants and communications providers might
not be as directly coercive as those with the entities that govern our
livelihoods and dwellings.
Because these relationships are more
impersonal, perhaps it should be left to the market decide this issue. If
consumers demand companies that protect their information from the
government, then the market will reflect these choices.
Thus far, however, the market has not been responsive to this issue.
As discussed earlier, privacy policies are often vague about information
flows to the government.439 Individuals are usually unaware of the extent
to which information about them is collected.440 As Edward Janger and
Paul Schwartz point out, privacy is often a nonprice term in a negotiation
that people do not adequately understand. In addition, the market fails to
afford sufficient incentives to correct this information asymmetry.441
Further, private sector entities have never established a relationship with
the people whose data they have collected.
Even if people are informed, they have little choice but to hand over
information to third parties. Life in the Information Age depends upon
sharing information with a host of third party entities including phone
companies, ISPs, cable companies, merchants, financial entities, medical
and insurance providers, and so on. The Supreme Court in Smith and
Miller has suggested that if people want to protect privacy, they should not
share their information with third parties. However, refraining from doing
so may result in people living as Information Age hermits, without credit
cards, banks, Internet service, phones and television. The market does not
seem to offer a wide array of choices for people on the basis of the amount
of privacy they would like to protect. People rarely seem to bargain about
privacy policies, especially provisions about sharing information with the
government. The policies are not individually negotiated, but are one-sizefits-all. According to Schwartz, this state of affairs is caused by the
problem of “bounded rationality” in which people, “when faced with
standardized terms, . . . frequently accept whatever industry offers

439. See supra Part II.B.
440. Solove, supra note 7, at 1427–28.
441. Edward J. Janger & Paul M. Schwartz, The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, Information Privacy,
and the Limits of Default Rules, 86 MINN. L. REV. 1219, 1241–42 (2002).
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them.”442 Given the current state of affairs, there is little hope that the
market will achieve adequate protection alone.
Therefore, the scope of the architecture must be defined broadly to
encompass any third party that maintains a “system of records.” This
definition of scope is not perfect, and there may be hard cases that call for
exceptions. However, this rule would provide clear guidance to law
enforcement officials when gathering information from third parties. This
clarity is a virtue. Unlike the existing statutory architecture, which is
complicated and often full of notable gaps, this architecture has clear and
simple boundaries.
B. STRUCTURE: REGULATED SUBPOENAS
Many different procedural mechanisms are available to control
government information gathering. These mechanisms fall on a spectrum
from no control over information-gathering on one end to complete
restriction of it on the other. In the middle of the spectrum are mechanisms
of oversight—where the government can access information only upon
making certain showings before a neutral and external party who must
authorize the access.
On the “no control” end of the spectrum, private sector entities may
voluntarily disclose personal information to the government. If it so
desired, Amazon.com could connect its computers to those of the FBI. If a
private sector entity does not volunteer information, then the government
can compel its production with a mere subpoena. The entity need not
contest the subpoena or provide notice to the person to whom the
information pertains. Whether the entity does so would be left up to
market forces—to contracts between the entity and the consumer or privacy
policies.
On the other end of the spectrum are architectural mechanisms of
restriction—prohibitions on government collection and use of information.
These mechanisms are embodied in the architecture of the Fifth
Amendment and certain evidentiary privileges. The Fifth Amendment
provides that “[n]o person . . . shall be compelled in any criminal case to be
a witness against himself.”443 The Fifth Amendment’s “privilege against
self-incrimination” prevents the government from compelling individuals
to testify against themselves, and completely bars use of the information

442.
443.

Schwartz, Internet Privacy and the State, supra note 6, at 822–23.
U.S. CONST. amend V.
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obtained in violation of the right at trial. In contrast, under the Fourth
Amendment architecture, evidence is admissible at trial so long as the
government obtains it pursuant to a valid search warrant.
The architecture of evidentiary privileges resembles in many respects
the architecture of the Fifth Amendment, because privileges bar access to
certain evidence altogether. Evidentiary privileges not only restrict the
ability to obtain true information, but also the ability to present it at trial.
As a result, privileges are sparingly recognized. For example, when
independent prosecutor Kenneth Starr subpoenaed Monica Lewinsky’s
mother to testify against her daughter in front of a grand jury, there was a
large public outcry at the tactic.444 Although in many states, spouses may
refuse to testify against each other in a criminal trial about confidential
information that is known to the spouse,445 most jurisdictions refuse to
recognize a similar privilege for parents and children.446
For certain relationships, complete restriction is necessary to protect
the relationship. Where privacy is essential to the functioning of
relationships that have a high social value, then the architecture of
privileges is highly protective. Certain relationships depend upon the
revelation of information. Privileges protect against “the general evil of
infusing reserve and dissimulation, uneasiness, and suspicion and fear, into
those communications which must take place.”447 As one court has noted,
“by prearrangement with a criminal suspect’s priest, minister or rabbi,
psychiatrist or other physician, or lawyer, the police could obtain
information of great value in combating crime. The only question is
whether the price would be too high.”448 Certainly not all relationships that
depend upon privacy are worth protecting. For example, criminal
conspirators need privacy, but we do not consider the protection of these
relationships to be socially beneficial. It is only those relationships that are
important to society—such as the attorney-client and patient-physician
relationships—that are protected by mechanisms of restriction.
Often, however, privacy is not essential to the relationship’s existence,
but is implicated in it. Exchange of information is incidental to most
444. Ruth Marcus, To Some in the Law, Starr’s Tactics Show a Lack of Restraint, WASH. POST,
Feb. 13, 1998, at A1.
445. Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 49–50 (1980). However, a spouse can waive the
right to refuse to testify, and, if so, the defendant spouse cannot prevent his or her spouse from
testifying. Id. at 52–53.
446. In re Grand Jury, 103 F.3d 1140, 1146 (3d Cir. 1997) (observing that most federal and state
courts have rejected the privilege).
447. Pearse v. Pearse, 63 Eng. Rep. 950, 957 (1846).
448. United States v. Neal, 532 F. Supp. 942, 946 (D. Colo. 1982).
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commercial transactions and employment relationships.
Adopting
mechanisms of restriction to these relationships would herald a return to the
regime of Boyd v. United States.449
In Boyd, the Court held that the Fourth and Fifth Amendments
prevented the government from issuing a subpoena to obtain a person’s
private papers.450 Later, in Gouled v. United States,451 the Court held that
search warrants could not be used to gain access to one’s “house or office
or papers” merely to obtain evidence to use against that person in a
criminal proceeding.452 Under the rationale of Boyd and Gouled, the
government could seize papers if they were instrumentalities of a crime or
illegal contraband but not if they were merely evidence of a crime. This
rule became known as the “mere evidence” rule.
The Boyd and Gouled regime has long been dismantled. The mere
evidence rule was overturned in Warden v. Hayden,453 where the Court
eliminated the rule and permitted searches to find evidence of crimes.454
Moreover, the Fifth Amendment was virtually eliminated as a protection
against government access to personal information in records. In Shapiro
v. United States,455 the Court held that requiring a person to produce
required records did not violate the Fifth Amendment. In Couch v. United
States,456 the government issued a subpoena to the defendant’s accountant
to obtain documents pertaining to its investigation of tax fraud.457 The
defendant challenged the subpoena on the basis that it violated his Fifth
Amendment right against compulsory self-incrimination.458 The Court
rejected the challenge reasoning that “the Fifth Amendment privilege is a
personal privilege: it adheres basically to the person, not to information
that may incriminate him.”459 Because the subpoena was issued on a third
party, “[i]nquisitorial pressure or coercion against a potentially accused
person, compelling her, against her will, to utter self-condemning words or
produce incriminating documents is absent.”460 Likewise, in Fisher v.

449.
450.
451.
452.
453.
454.
455.
456.
457.
458.
459.
460.

116 U.S. 616 (1886).
See id. at 638.
255 U.S. 298 (1921).
Id. at 309.
387 U.S. 294 (1967).
See id. at 309–10.
335 U.S. 1 (1948).
409 U.S. 322 (1973).
See id. at 323.
See id.
Id. at 328.
Id. at 329.
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United States,461 the Court held that the Fifth Amendment privilege did not
apply to subpoenas issued upon a person’s attorney.462 The Fifth
Amendment, reasoned the Court, “protects against compelled selfincrimination, not the disclosure of private information.”463 In other words,
according to the Court, the Fifth Amendment could not “serve as a general
protector of privacy” and was limited to protecting against only the
compulsion to testify against oneself.464
Resurrecting the “mere evidence” rule and applying it to third party
records would effectively bar the government from seeking and using
records entirely unless they were the very instrumentalities through which a
crime was perpetrated. This would cripple modern criminal investigation.
As Stuntz observes: “Government regulation require[s] lots of information,
and Boyd came dangerously close to giving regulated actors a blanket
entitlement to nondisclosure. It is hard to see how modern health, safety,
environmental, or economic regulation would be possible in such a
regime.”465 Because Boyd rested in part on the Fifth Amendment, it
completely prevented the government from obtaining and using the papers
against the defendant no matter what procedure the government had used to
obtain them.
In the middle of the spectrum are mechanisms of oversight. An
architecture containing this type of mechanism is preferable to regulate
government access of records held by third parties maintaining “systems of
records.” Mechanisms of oversight allow the government to gather
information by making adequate showings before a neutral detached party.
Oversight is embodied in the Fourth Amendment’s per se warrant rule.
The warrant requirement achieves the aims of minimization,
particularization, and control. Collection is minimized by the requirement
that the government justify that its information gathering is legitimate and
necessary. The warrant ensures particularization with its requirement that
there be probable cause that a particular person be engaged in criminal
activity. Finally, the warrant achieves control (at least over the collection
efforts) by having a neutral and detached party authorize the collection.
In many cases, warrants are the best regulatory device for government
information-gathering. Often, at the point during an investigation that
certain information from third parties becomes important for law
461.
462.
463.
464.
465.

425 U.S. 391 (1976).
See id. at 414.
Id. at 401 (internal quotations and alterations omitted).
Id.
Stuntz, supra note 215, at 1050.
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enforcement officials to obtain, there is already enough evidence to support
a warrant. In both Smith and Miller there was probably sufficient evidence
for the police to secure warrants. Therefore, the requirement of a warrant
hopefully prevents cases of illegitimate abuses such as large-scale
information sweeps and investigations without particularized suspicion,
without unduly interfering with legitimate law enforcement activities.
Further, third party records have few of the dangers that make warrants
inefficient. For example, because third parties maintain the records, there
are fewer opportunities for a suspect to hide or destroy documents during
the time law enforcement officials obtain a warrant.
However, as discussed above, merely applying the Fourth Amendment
to government access to private sector records proves inadequate. First, is
difficult to incorporate the “system of records” scope into the Fourth
Amendment’s reasonable expectations of privacy approach to determining
the scope of protection. Second, the exclusionary rule only provides a
remedy at trial, and many of the abuses associated with government
information-gathering extend far beyond criminal trials.
Despite being far more permissive for government informationgathering purposes, subpoenas have certain protections not available with
search warrants. Unlike warrants, they can be challenged prior to the
seizure of the documents. The subpoenaed party can refuse to comply and
make a motion to quash before a judge. Further, subpoenas permit the
target to produce the documents rather than have government agents
rummage through the party’s home or belongings.466 The advantages of
subpoenas over search warrants are best illustrated in Zurcher v. The
Stanford Daily,467 where the police searched a newspaper’s offices for
evidence relating to a criminal suspect. The newspaper was not involved in
the alleged crime; it merely possessed evidence. The Court upheld the
search because it was made pursuant to a valid warrant. Dissenting justices
contended that there were First Amendment concerns with such searches
because they would disrupt newspaper operations and result in “the
possibility of disclosure of information received from confidential sources,
or of the identity of the sources themselves.”468 Congress responded to
Zurcher by passing the Privacy Protection Act of 1980,469 which restricts
the use of search warrants for offices of newspapers and other media

466.
467.
468.
469.

Fisher, supra note 238, at 151.
436 U.S. 547 (1978).
Id. at 571.
Pub. L. No. 96-440, 94 Stat. 1879, codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000aa (1994).
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entities for evidence of crimes of other parties. In effect, the Act requires
the use of subpoenas rather than warrants to obtain such evidence.
The benefits of subpoenas, however, often do not apply to subpoenas
for an individual’s records issued on third parties because the third party
does not need to notify the target or may not have any incentive to
challenge the subpoena in court.470 Further, as discussed before, subpoenas
have many weaknesses compared to warrants, such as a lack of requiring
particularized suspicion and little protection by way of oversight by the
judiciary.471
Therefore, the Fourth Amendment architecture should be resurrected
statutorily, by heightening the standards required for the government to
obtain a subpoena or court order. In this way, the statutory regime could
require more stringent requirements for subpoenas and court orders, such as
notice to the target and particularized suspicion. In other words, subpoenas
and court orders could be strengthened to resemble warrants. This
statutory regime would incorporate the exclusionary rule, a minimum
statutory damages provision, and a framework by which to discipline
offending law enforcement officials.
If subpoenas are not made identical to warrants, an alternative
structural device, a “regulated subpoena,” could be used. A regulated
subpoena would be similar to a warrant. It would require notice to the third
party from whom the records are sought and to the subject of the records
being searched so that they may be able to contest the subpoena. In certain
exigent circumstances, there may be exceptions to notice, as there are
currently for warrants.472
The regulated subpoena would require probable cause that the suspect
is engaged in criminal activity. Specific records need not directly contain
evidence of criminal activity but must be of “material importance” to the
investigation. This differs from the standards often used by the statutory
regime for subpoenas and court records in two respects. First, unlike the
existing court order standard, where the person to whom the records pertain
need not be involved in criminal activity at all, the regulated subpoena
requires that the government demonstrate probable cause that the person is
engaged in criminal activity. Second, unlike “relevance,” the standard of

470. Some states, such as California, have enacted laws requiring the notification of the people to
whom the records pertain. See CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 1985.3; Degnan, supra note 411, at 233.
471. See supra Part IV.B.
472. I am not contending that all of the existing exceptions to notice are valid; rather, I believe
that some of these exceptions are acceptable.
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“material importance” is narrower. It is slightly more permissive than that
of a warrant, which requires that the records contain evidence of criminal
activity. However, unlike a warrant, the regulated subpoena can be
challenged in court.
This approach is similar to courts’ imposing heightened requirements
when private parties seek to subpoena the identities of anonymous
speakers. Consider, for example, Doe v. 2TheMart.com,473 where the court
held that a subpoena for the identities of anonymous speakers requires
heightened standards to protect the right to speak anonymously.474
According to the court, four factors determine whether a subpoena can be
issued:
(1) the subpoena seeking the information [must be] issued in good faith
and not for any improper purpose, (2) the information sought relates to a
core claim or defense, (3) the identifying information is directly and
materially relevant to that claim or defense, and (4) information
sufficient to establish or disprove that claim or defense is unavailable
from other sources.

Other courts have articulated similar tests.475 Even based on existing
law, government subpoenas that compel information to reveal the identity
of an anonymous speaker would seemingly fall within the reasoning of
these courts and require heightened standards. However, a regulated
subpoena would apply beyond situations where information is likely to
affect anonymous speech to other forms of personal information.
The regulated subpoena requirement would contain certain exceptions.
The general rule is that third parties maintaining personal information in a
“system of records” cannot voluntarily disclose information to the
government. Under compelling circumstances, however, third parties
maintaining systems of records should be able to disclose facts voluntarily
to the government. Compelling circumstances might include an imminent
threat of harm to another. Another exception would allow the individual to
whom the records pertain to authorize the government to obtain them from
the third party without having to meet the heightened standards of the
regulated subpoena. For example, if a victim of computer hacking wanted
to permit the government to access the victim’s ISP records, the victim
could authorize the government to do so.

473.
474.
475.

140 F. Supp.2d 1088 (W.D. Wash. 2001).
Id. at 1089–93.
See, e.g., Columbia Ins. Co. v. Seescandy.com, 185 F.R.D. 573 (N.D. Cal. 1999).
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Whether by reversing the third party doctrine, imposing Fourth
Amendment restrictions on subpoenas, or restricting subpoenas via statute,
the important point is that all of these approaches incorporate some of the
central aspects of Fourth Amendment architecture: requiring a limitation in
scope of the information that may be obtained and requiring meaningful
external oversight.
C. REGULATING POST-COLLECTION USE OF DATA
The procedural architectural features discussed in the previous section
are not sufficient to afford adequate protection to privacy. Another
problem that must be addressed is the way personal information is used
once it has been collected. As Stuntz astutely observes: “Fourth
Amendment law regulates the government’s efforts to uncover information,
but it says nothing about what the government may do with the information
it uncovers. Yet as the Clinton investigation shows, often the greater
privacy intrusion is not the initial disclosure but the leaks that follow.”476
Carol Steiker notes: “Unlike other countries in North America and Western
Europe, the United States [has] never developed a national plan to organize
a ‘system’ of policing or to provide for centralized control over police
authority.”477 Once information is collected, the Fourth Amendment’s
architecture of oversight no longer applies. This is problematic, as many of
the abuses of information by the government discussed earlier occur after
the information has been collected.
The Privacy Act of 1974478 provides some limited regulation of
records maintained by government law enforcement entities. However, the
Act contains many exceptions and loopholes that have limited its
effectiveness. Government entities can share information widely with each
other. Further, information may be disclosed for any “routine use,” an
exception that many have criticized as a significant loophole.479 As Robert
Gellman astutely observes, the Privacy Act provides a “vague standard”
that fails to serve as “a significant barrier to the sharing of personal
information within agencies.”480 Additionally, the Act applies only to the
federal government. Fewer than a third of the states have a privacy law
similar to the Privacy Act.481
476.
477.
478.
479.
480.
481.

Stuntz, supra note 252, at 857.
Steiker, supra note 121, at 834.
5 U.S.C. § 552a (2000).
See, e.g., Schwartz, supra note 5, at 585–86.
Gellman, supra note 141, at 198.
Solove, supra note 50.
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The Privacy Act is an important first step in reigning in the vast stores
of data that government entities collect. There remains, however, much
room for the Privacy Act to be improved and strengthened. One possible
way to provide a safeguard is to mandate the destruction of data after
certain periods of time or, mandate the transfer of data to the judicial
branch, after a certain period of time, for access only under special
circumstances.
Another way is to adopt a meaningful-purpose
specification restriction.
This means that, with certain reasonable
exceptions, information collected from third party records may only be
used for the particular purpose for which it is collected.
VI. CONCLUSION
One of the most significant threats to privacy of our times,
government information-gathering and-use, is inadequately regulated. The
Court’s Fourth Amendment jurisprudence has been mired in the difficulties
of conceptualizing privacy, thus preventing the application of the Fourth
Amendment. A statutory regime has arisen to fill the void, but it is
severely flawed. A new architecture of power must be constructed, one
that effectively regulates the government’s collection and use of third party
records. This task is not easy in a rapidly changing society that is adjusting
to the profound new dimensions of the Information Age. This Article is
thus a beginning of the process.
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